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Summary 
This market study will seek to understand the impact of the Low Cost Carriers (LCC) 
model in Asia. There are generally two LCC business models, Value-Based or Deep 
Discount model. Between the two basic low cost business models is a third variant – the 
Long-Haul Discount model. Asia Pacific, a far-flung region and accounts for 56% of the 
world population and favorable macro environments coupled with a large growing 
affluent population will fuel new demand for discretionary travel. Asian LCC with the 
right business model and strategies will definitely ride on this huge potential and emulate 
the success demonstrate in North American and Europe. The current LCC market share is 
estimated to be about 5% in Asia Pacific and could increase to about 11% in 2010, and 
could reach higher rates if external macro environment remains favorable. Although the 
pace of bilateral liberalization is spreading at a much slower pace than in other markets 
around the world, the emergence of low cost carriers in Asia Pacific is accelerating this 
trend. This market trend will greatly benefit the aerospace industry suppliers, aircraft 
lessors and OEM such as Hamilton Sundstrand (HS). HS engineering expertise and 
capabilities in integrating their whole supply chain to bring added value to their 
customers has put them in a strong position and a source of their competitive advantage. 
It is recommended that Hamilton Sundstrand should pursue a differentiation strategy for 
its unique selling proposition of OEM quality at a guarantee cost and exploit the Internet 
to reach its customer via e-commerce. Additionally, HS need to have a culture of 
continuous improvement and consolidate core work to the lower cost HS plants, and 
outsource non-core products and services to other companies. This will enhance HS 
ability to better compete in the global marketplace.  
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Introduction 
Purpose of Study 
Many new entrepreneurs are starting low cost carriers (LCC) in Asia to chase for the pot 
of gold at the end of the rainbow. Sir Richard Branson, the flamboyant British 
entrepreneur was the first kid off the block in Asia. With A$10 million investment, he 
started Virgin Blue venture in Australia in the third quarter of 2000 with a fleet of B737-
400. Followed closely behind was Tony Fernandez, who took control of Air Asia in 
Malaysia, through Tune Air in December 2001. The capital investment in Air Asia is 
about US$21 million. Virgin Blue and Air Asia shares were listed in late 2003 and 2004 
respectively. With market capitalization of US$1.4 billion for Virgin Blue and US$1.0 
billion for Air Asia, the two initial investors in the companies derived huge returns on 
their investments.  
 
Since then, chasing the next pot of gold at the end of the rainbow is the dream for many 
new entrepreneurs in many parts of Asia. To name a few are Raymond Lee of Hong Kong 
starting the Oasis Hong Kong Airlines; Kingfisher Airlines in India, which is under the 
leadership of a successful Indian billionaire, Vijay Mallya (which also owns the popular 
Indian beer of the same name); Adam Air, which is founded in 2002 by Mr. Agung 
Laksono, a well-known Indonesian businessman and politician, and Mrs. Sandra Ang. 
However, at the other end of the spectrum is the rumour of consolidation and merger in 
the LCC market due to the persistence high oil prices, and slow deregulation of the Asia 
aviation market. In Singapore, the consolidation has begun to take place with the merger 
of JetStar Asia and Valuair. Therefore the risks of failures for LCC are very high.  
 
This market study will seek to understand the impact of the LCC model in Asia and 
provide answers to the following questions. Is the LCC model feasible in Asia? What 
business model can the Asian LCC adopt to mitigate the risks and continue to thrive in a 
highly competitive and regulated Asia market? With the Asian LCC adding more than 
200 aircrafts in the next few years, is there a risk of overcrowding in the markets? Will 
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the process be similar to the deregulation experience of the US and European aviation 
markets. Which key industries will ride on the LCC growth?  
 
This paper will also seek to understand LCC cost structure and how they would spend 
their money on Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul (MRO) services. Will they build in-
house MRO capabilities or outsource to other? Additionally, how can OEM such as 
Hamilton Sundstrand repackage the aftermarket services to cater to this new business 
model? 
 
Structure of the Thesis  
On the second chapter, a brief outline of the history of low cost carrier (LCC) in various 
parts of the world and the meaning of a LCC will be made clear. The fundamental 
concepts of LCC and the various LCC business models will also be presented follow with 
a detailed analysis of JetBlue competitive advantage using Porter’s value chain 
framework. This is to understand why JetBlue can still be profitable despite pursuing both 
low cost and differentiating strategies at the same, contrary to Porter’s view that 
organization should avoid being ‘stuck in the middle’. Will the LCC model be feasible in 
Asia since it has been successfully applied in other parts of the world? 
   
There are many books and articles that have been written on LCC model and about the 
most successful LCC airline in the world, i.e. Southwest Airlines. However, what is LCC 
market potential in Asia? The third chapter will scan the macro environment to 
understand the factors that will provide the engine of growth for the LCC in Asia.  
 
In the fourth chapter, an analysis using aircraft fleet data from ACAS database will seek 
to understand the type of equipment deployed by LCC and determine the future trend. 
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This will help to understand the potential beneficiaries of LCC growth, which will be 
discuss in details in the sixth chapter.   
 
The key to LCC survival in Asia will largely depend on how the deregulation progress in 
this region. The fifth chapter examines if the aviation deregulation process that happen in 
US and the European market will be duplicated in Asia.  
 
The last chapter conclude how the LCC growth will impact the MRO industry and OEM 
(Original Equipment Supplier) such as Hamilton Sundstrand. Using Porter’s five forces 
framework, we seek to understand the MRO market structure and then proceed to 
evaluate Hamilton Sundstrand strength and weakness in relation to the external 
environment using the SWOT framework. We then present the findings for this study and 
the recommendations for Hamilton Sundstrand to strengthen its competitive advantage. 
We also propose business strategies that Hamilton Sundstrand can pursue to win in the 
MRO market. 
 
Methodology 
The methodology that will be adopted to achieve the objectives of this study will include 
preliminary research, data requirements and collection approach. The preliminary 
research has been conducted on the topic before the commencement of the study. The 
research included the insight into successful LCC model such as Southwest Airlines & 
Ryanair. Existing literature on LCC Model was also explored through the study of books, 
articles and journals. 
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In selecting a data collection approach, it is necessary to give careful consideration to the 
study’s data requirements. Due to the existence of many aviation databases, the option of 
relying on secondary data sources was viewed as adequate. This include but not limited to 
information from Airline Association, Boeing, Airbus, OEM that the writer work for, 
such as Hamilton Sundstrand and data archive from ACAS, which is available through 
subscription. Local Air Authority which keeps detailed database on airline operating 
characteristics provides another reliable source of information.   
 
Conclusion 
With the structure and methodology for this study explained in this chapter. This will 
provide an understanding to the underlying process towards the completion of this 
dissertation. With a better understanding of the analytical framework utilize in this study, 
it will improve the credibility of the conclusion and the recommendation. 
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LOW COST CARRIER BUSINESS MODELS 
Introduction 
Is the low cost carrier model feasible in Asia? Hamel (2000) argues that the age of 
continuity is over and we have now entered the age of revolution where the value of 
incumbency is being eroded and those companies that embrace discontinuous change will 
be the winners. The revolutionaries will win through innovatory business concepts 
embodied in new business models. This paper will seek to analyze the viability of this 
new breed of air carrier, the low cost carrier, and the new business model’s impact on the 
Asian airline market. It will also look for the key sectors that will benefit from low cost 
airline growth in Asia. Although, harsh market conditions and financial turmoil surrounds 
the global airline industry today, many ambitious entrepreneurs are aspiring to set up low 
cost carrier (LCC) models in Asia to chase for the pot of gold at the end of the rainbow. 
The worldwide airline markets continue to evolve with air fares declining globally and 
almost 30 percent in the leading market of United States since 1993 (see Exhibit 1) and 
the airline industry size has grown rapidly since 1980.  
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Exhibit 1: Average Airline Yields per Revenue Passenger   
 
Source: IATA 
 
Airline customers have been the main beneficiaries. The early predictions by economists 
that airline deregulation would improve consumer welfare have been confirmed to be 
right (Borenstein 1992). A recent study by United States Government Accountability 
Office also revealed the change in fares and services since competitive free market 
system was introduced provides evidence that the vast majority of consumers have 
benefited, though not to the same level for all (Hecker, June 2006). Today’s airline 
market has evolved noticeably since the late 1980s, although low cost airlines carry only 
23% of the domestic traffic in the United States, their impact on prices is significant and 
vast majority of the airline customers have benefited (Hecker, June 2006). However, as 
exhibit 1 illustrated, there are other factors that have appear to lower yields across the 
airline industry, even on sectors where there is limited competition from LCCs. Rivalry 
among legacy network airlines, along with efficiency gains passed on to customers, have 
also seen yields declined to a similar extent on, for example, long-haul flights from 
Europe and routes operated by Asian network airlines. 
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History 
The first successful low cost carrier was Pacific Southwest Airlines in the United States, 
which pioneered the concept when their first flight took place on May 6, 1949. Often, this 
credit has been erroneously given to Southwest Airlines which began service in 1971 and 
has been profitable every year since 1973. With the advent of deregulation in the aviation 
industry, the model has spread to Europe as well, the most notable successes being 
Ireland's Ryanair, which began low-fares operations in 1991, and easyJet, formed in 1995. 
As of 2000, low cost carriers are now edging into Asia Pacific, led by operators such as 
Malaysia's AirAsia, and Australia's Virgin Blue.  
 
In 2000, Impulse and Virgin Blue commenced low cost operations bringing fierce 
competition to Australian cities. Richard Branson begins Virgin Blue with an initial 
investment capital of A$10 million and eventually lists it in late 2003 with a market 
capitalization of US$1.4 Billion. Impulse operation was short-lived, while Virgin Blue 
progress to become Australia second largest airline after the demise of Ansett Australia. 
The dominant carrier in Australia, Qantas has also launched two low cost carriers. JetStar 
competes with Virgin Blue in the Australian domestic market, while Australian Airlines 
operates internationally to Asian destinations. Since June 2006, Australian Airlines has 
also ceased operations, with Qantas preferring to retain the JetStar brand due to the low 
profit generated by Australian Airlines.  
 
In December 2001, Tony Fernandez, a major investor in Tune Air, took control of 
Malaysia AirAsia after buying the heavily indebted airline from a government-owned 
conglomerate DRB-Hicom. His initial investment was about RM81 million (US$21 
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million). AirAsia shares were finally listed in November 2004 with a market 
capitalization of US$1.0 billion, bringing huge returns to the initial investor. It now 
operates from Kuala Lumpur, Johor Bahru, Bangkok and Jakarta and has two 
subsidiaries, Indonesia AirAsia and Thai AirAsia. On March 2006, AirAsia strengthen 
further its market position when the government of Malaysia announced that AirAsia will 
take over from Malaysia Airlines and service 96 local destinations in Malaysia, in 
addition to 19 trunk domestic destinations.  
 
Singapore's first low cost carrier, Valuair started operation on May 5, 2004. In response to 
the competition, the island flag carrier Singapore Airlines promptly starts its own new 
low cost carrier, Tiger Airways, to protect its own turf. Not to be left behind, Singapore 
Changi Airport's second most dominant carrier, Qantas Airways also launched its own 
LCC, JetStar Asia Airways. JetStar Asia commences operations on December 2004. 
Consolidation was inevitable in the small Singapore market and Valuair finally succumb 
to competitive pressure and merged with JetStar Asia in July 2005. Since July 2006, 
JetStar Asia, Valuair and JetStar International has merged and reposition into one single 
brand "JETSTAR" and market itself as the long-haul LCC that has international 
operations to destinations in South East Asia, Japan and the Pacific.  
 
Definition of Low Cost Carrier 
There is no standard business model or definition for an LCC. The term itself covers a 
wide range of airlines with considerable amount of differences in the type of routes and 
the level of passenger service offered. Southwest in United States is a good example of a 
pure no-frills airline, targeting customers through low prices. By contrast, JetBlue 
 
 
 
- 17 - 
markets itself as the “best service at low prices”, provides some passenger services such 
as in-flight TVs and flies into major airports. However, both airlines are viewed as LCCs.  
 
This paper defines Low cost carrier (LCC) or low cost airline (also known as a no-frills 
or discount carrier / airline) as an airline that generally provides low fares and does away 
with many long established passenger services. The model started out in the United States 
before proliferating to Europe in the early 1990s and subsequently to the rest of the world. 
Since deregulation in 1978, airlines in United States are allow to openly compete with 
each other, the most prominent and successful low cost carrier, Southwest, have 
consistently been profitable for every year. This is partially facilitated by its lower cost 
structure, which is 36% to 45% lower than the legacy network carriers (exhibit 2) and 
also the Southwest way of utilizing resources efficiently to provide a consistent reliable 
service.  
 
Exhibit 2 
Adjusted Cost per ASK for US Airlines, 1996-2004 
 
Source: IATA 
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On the other spectrum of the low cost carrier are the full service network carriers which 
traditionally operated out of a hub and spoke arrangement. The cost gap between low cost 
carrier and traditional network carrier is a result of lower seat density, higher labor cost, 
operating older fleet, higher infrastructure and distribution costs for the legacy carrier. A 
study commission by IATA shows a significant cost gap between Southwest and the 
legacy carriers such as American, Delta and United Airlines (Exhibit 3A).  
 
Exhibit 3A 
Southwest Cost vs. Network Carrier 
 
Source: IATA 
 
A traditional major carrier often counteracts the LCC model with a number of tools to 
deter entry or lessen the competitiveness of recent entrants. These tools include predatory 
pricing, loyalty programs, and congestion at the nation’s most popular airports. However, 
these tools are not effective against low cost carriers with point-to-point networks. The 
low cost carrier can successfully neutralize the market power of its competitors, by 
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competing on price. The lower cost structure can be quantified by aggregating the cost 
savings of point-to-point networks, wage savings, and savings from not providing 
numerous frills. While labor costs are one of the largest single cost items for airlines, 
there are many other costs (exhibit 3B). The difference in cost between the low cost and 
legacy carriers is not attributable to the wage differential alone. However, controlling 
labor costs can improve the bottom line as the primary cost for any carrier is labor related. 
 
Exhibit 3B 
Airline Cost Distribution 
INSURANCE, 0.7OTHERS, 22.2
OWNERSHIP, 12.9
FUEL, 24.7
COM M UNICATION, 1
AD & PROM OTION, 
0.9
UTILS & OFFICE 
SUPPLIES, 0.6
FOOD & BEVERAGE 
, 1.5
PROFESSIONAL 
SERVICES, 6.9
PASSENGER 
COM M ISSIONS, 1.2
LABOR, 24.2LANDING FEES, 1.9
M AINTENANCE 
M ATERIAL, 1.3
 
Source: Air Transport Association, 2005 
 
Value versus Deep Discount Business Models 
The emergence and growth of no frills, low cost carriers (LCCs) have drastically altered 
the nature of competition within the airline industry, especially on short-haul flights. The 
major LCCs have taken advantage of different operational methods such as fewer service 
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offerings with charges for in-flight catering, distribution efficiencies through internet-only 
bookings and point-to-point routes from secondary airports etc to bring down their cost 
base and to drive down the average fares paid by customers. However, not all LCCs are 
turning in a profit, with only a small number of market-leading LCCs such as Southwest, 
AirAsia, Ryanair and GOL, producing a consistent level of returns above their cost of 
capital. Typical low cost carrier business model practices include: 
 
• A simple fare structure (typically ticket price rise as the plane capacity fills up, which 
rewards early reservations, known as "yield management") with a focus on price 
competition.  
• Typically a single passenger class (typically economy class only) with strong focus on 
price sensitive traffic, mostly leisure passengers and no (or limited) customer loyalty 
programs. 
• Employed a common fleet, usually the Airbus A320 families or Boeing 737 families 
to cut down on training and servicing costs.  
• Unassigned seating arrangements to influence passengers to board early and speedily. 
• Flying to cheaper, less congested secondary airports to evade air traffic delays and 
take advantage of lower landing fees. In certain region, the local authorities may even 
reward the LCC in the form of subsidies to bring in traffic to revive the local 
economy. A win-win situation for both parties. LCC strategic choice to minimize its 
competitive interactions with legacy full service airlines adds validity to the previous 
arguments by Borenstein (1989) that legacy airlines have considerable dominance 
over the market and have the resources to preserve their dominance over lucrative 
routes with their hub and spoke strategy.  
 
 
 
- 21 - 
• In-flight passenger services are do away with (or limited), and replaced by optional 
paid-for in-flight food and drink.  
• Simplified routes structure, primarily point-to-point transit instead of transfers at hubs 
to allow highest utilization of planes. 
• Quick turnaround times of aircraft and serving short-haul routes (again enhancing 
aircraft utilization).   
• Emphasis on direct sales of tickets over the Internet (avoiding fees and commissions 
paid to travel agents and corporate booking systems).  
• A simple management and overhead structure with a lean strategic decision-making 
process. 
• Employees have flexible job boundaries, for instance flight attendants also cleaning 
the aircraft or working as gate agents (limiting personnel costs).  
 
From the analysis of the spectrum of LCC models in the market, it can be deduce that not 
all LCC models are similar. The term low cost is a misnomer, because there are various 
degrees of operating cost structures, as well as the services provided by the range of low 
cost airlines in the market. From a range of Asia Pacific LCC models such as AirAsia, 
JetStar, Tiger Airways and Virgin Blue. The key distinguishing factor between the two 
basic LCC business models is cost. AirAsia and Tiger Airways attempt to be the lowest-
cost operators in Asia Pacific, while JetStar and Virgin Blue plan for cost structures that 
are lower than those of the network carriers to take advantage of high-yield traffic.  
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Value-Based Airlines: easyJet in Europe  
The easyJet business model focuses on maximizing yields while trying to maintain 
operating costs at about 30% or more lower than the traditional full-service network 
airlines. As indicated in diagram 1, the model focuses on building a high frequency point-
to-point network in the higher disposable-income continental European markets to benefit 
from the higher yield leisure and business traffic.  
 
Diagram 1: Value-based Airline Business Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: easyJet 
 
The fares are dynamic and designed to extract maximum yield from the airline’s network. 
There is no fixed ceiling fare and the airlines can charge as much as the market is willing 
to pay. The fares start as low as £7 and can increase tenfold just before the flight takes 
off. Perhaps the most important feature of easyJet’s business model is that the airline 
strives to be the lowest cost airline operator between two airports, and this does not have 
to be the lowest cost airline operator in the industry. This explains why easyJet operates 
in both primary and secondary airports in Europe. 
•Dense point-to-point network
•Strong, Highly visible brand
•Dynamic fares
•100% direct sales
•Highly utilised standardised fleet
•Scaleable
The Model
High volume growth
Yields are managed to 
achieve high load factors
Unit costs declining
Innovation
•High returns
•Excellent growth prospects
•Track record of delivery 
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In Asia, the best examples of the value-based airlines are JetStar and Virgin Blue where 
both airlines have focused on supplying to the customer a value product of free in-flight 
meals and airport lounges at competitive prices to the full-service carriers. However, in 
contrast to the easyJet business model, there is a cap on the maximum fare for Asian 
value-based airlines, which is set at about 20-25% below the normal fare by the legacy 
full-service airlines. The easyJet business model could be changing since the acquisition 
of a 10% equity stake by Icelandair in October 2004, and the new management team is 
looking for fresh ideas to improve operating margins. 
 
Deep Discount Airlines: Ryanair in Europe  
The goal is to be the lowest cost airline operator in the industry (Exhibit 4). The relentless 
drive to bring unit operating costs down every year has provided Ryanair with the 
competitive advantage of being able to set the lowest fares in the market. All operating 
cost components, aircraft equipment cost (depreciation or lease rentals), labor expenses 
and airport charges are continually monitored to ensure that the unit operating costs will 
trend downwards every year. Ryanair continued to deliver cost efficiencies from a very 
low cost base, with its cost gap to the network airlines widening from 52% in 1997 to 
64% in 2004 as shown in exhibit 4. 
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Exhibit 4  
Ryanair Cost per Available Seat Kilometer 
 
Source: IATA 
 
In Asia, Tiger Airways and AirAsia are the best examples of deep discount airlines, with 
both airlines being known as the lowest airline cost operators in the industry. AirAsia 
currently has the lowest unit cost of 2.11 US cents per available seat kilometer among all 
the Asia Pacific airlines, despite the sharp rise in jet fuel prices in 2004/05. The main 
difference between the two basic LCC business models is profitability.  In Asia, both 
AirAsia and Tiger Airways, which emulate Ryanair’s business model, have set the goal of 
having the lowest-cost advantage in the Asia Pacific aviation market, and both airlines 
aim to consistently keep fares at competitive rates (Table 1).  
 
 
 
 
- 25 - 
Table 1: Comparison of Asia Pacific Low Cost Airline 
Differences in Low cost Airline Model 
 AirAsia JetStar Tiger Valuair Virgin Blue 
Lowest fares in market X  x   
Lowest costs in market X  X   
Lowest breakeven in market X  X   
Standardized fleet  X x X X 
Low cost, uncongested airports X  x   
High frequency X  x  X 
Strong balance sheet X    X 
High ancillary sales X     
Consistently profitable X    X 
 
 Source: Company data, Hamilton Sundstrand 
 
Between the two basic low cost business models is a third variant – the long-haul 
discount model.  The best example is JetBlue, which flies five to six hours from coast to 
coast in the US market, in contrast to Southwest, which focuses primarily on short-haul 
routes (JetBlue, 2002). Since its IPO on the NASDAQ stock exchange in 2002, JetBlue 
has become one of the most popular airline stocks in history and currently has a multi-
billion market capitalization The revamp JetStar is the best examples of the long-haul 
discount airline model in the Asia Pacific market with flights from Singapore to Perth.  
  
LCC Competitive Advantage 
The market position taken by the different LCCs is differentiating them from the 
incumbent. All their operational strategies are gear towards being the low cost competitor 
and then pass on some of the consumer surplus to the customers. However, from the 
review of the LCC business models, it can be seen that the LCCs are very different from 
each other because of the different target customer and therefore different cost structure. 
From an academic perspective, it is interesting to note that organization (such as JetBlue), 
 
 
 
- 26 - 
which systematically combine relative cost position and relative differentiation can result 
in competitive positions and can be successful too.  
 
According to Porter’s view, the firm that is stuck in the middle if more than one generic 
strategy were pursued is almost guaranteed low profitability. Porter’s logic was that a 
strategy aimed at achieving cost leadership precludes the capital investment or operating 
costs necessary for differentiation. How did JetBlue achieve this competitive advantage? 
We will examine JetBlue new business concepts based on Porter’s value chain. Michael 
Porter advocates the use of the value chain as the primary tool for diagnosing a firm’s 
competitive advantages. Porter’s value chain (Lewis et al. 1999) identifies five primary 
activities as follows: 
 
• Inbound logistics 
• Operations 
• Outbound logistics 
• Marketing and sales 
• Service 
 
JetBlue competitive advantage can be illustrated by means of the Porter’s value chain 
framework as shown on diagram 2 in the following page. 
 
 
 
- 27 - 
Diagram 2: Analysis of JetBlue Value Chain 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
‘Inbound Logistics’ 
JetBlue started with an initial funding of US$128 million and is the best-capitalized 
airline start-up in history. This means JetBlue is able to invest in the best product 
available. This is evident from the fleet of new airbus A320 aircraft, leather seats, satellite 
television programming and fast check-in technology. 
  
Operations 
JetBlue run a solid operation and this is demonstrated by their exceptional operational 
performance. For the year ended December 31, 2005, based on JetBlue data compared to 
the other major U.S. airlines:  
• JetBlue completion factor of 99.2% was higher than any of the other major U.S. 
airlines, which had an average completion factor of 98.2%, according to the DOT;  
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• JetBlue incidence of delayed, mishandled or lost bags of 4.06 per 1,000 customers 
was the lowest as compared to the other major U.S. airlines, which had an average of 
6.24 delayed, mishandled or lost bags per 1,000 customers, according to the DOT; 
and  
• JetBlue rate of customer complaints to the DOT per 100,000 passengers of 0.29 was 
the third lowest as compared to the other major U.S. airlines, which had an average of 
0.95 complaints, according to the DOT.  
 
“Outbound Logistics” 
JetBlue is relentless in keeping their operating costs low. The key to JetBlue’s low unit 
costs is the high productivity of their assets and crewmembers. Some of the contributing 
factors are:  
 
• JetBlue utilize their aircraft efficiently, with average daily utilization of 13.5 hours. 
By using their aircraft efficiently, they are able to spread their fixed costs over a 
greater number of flights. This is achieved through the improved reliability of a new 
fleet of aircraft which also require less maintenance than older aircraft. Quick 
turnaround of the aircraft at airport gate also increases the number of daily flights per 
aircraft.  
• JetBlue operate only two types of aircraft with a single class of service. Operating a 
limited number of aircraft types leads to increase cost savings as maintenance issues 
are simplified, spare parts inventory requirements are reduced, scheduling is more 
efficient and training costs are lower. A single class of service simplifies their 
operations, enhances productivity, increases our capacity and offers an operating cost 
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advantage. The recent addition of EMBRAER 190 aircraft into JetBlue is an 
extension of JetBlue business strategy. Despite losing some of the cost efficiencies 
associated with operating only one aircraft type, the additional market opportunities 
provided by this new aircraft will outweigh these additional costs. 
• JetBlue takes great care to hire and train crewmembers that are enthusiastic and 
committed to serving their customers and motivate them by using appropriate 
incentives. Crewmember productivity is created by greater fleet commonality, fewer 
unproductive labor work rules, use of part-time crewmembers and the effective use of 
advanced technology. For example, most of JetBlue reservation sales agents work 
from their homes, providing them better scheduling flexibility and allowing 
crewmembers to customize their desired schedules.  
• JetBlue achieves lower distribution costs by employing ticketless travel. Ticketless 
travel saves paper costs, postage, crewmember time and back-office processing 
expense. In addition, direct bookings by the customers save computer reservation 
systems fees. For the year ended December 31, 2005, 77.5% of the sales were booked 
on their website, and 22.5% were booked through the agents. 
 
Marketing & Sales  
Jet Blue builds a strong brand by giving consumers “the things they want, and nothing 
they don't”. JetBlue distinguish from their competitors as a safe, reliable, low fare airline 
that is focused on customer service and provides an enjoyable flying experience. To 
further enhance their brand loyalty, JetBlue implemented loyalty program in mid 2002 
which is a rarity in LCC business model. By the end of 2005, over three million 
customers had joined this program, and that number has been growing steadily since 
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inception. In 2005, JetBlue were voted the best domestic airline in the Conde Nast 
Traveler's Readers' Choice Awards for the fourth consecutive year and, for the third year 
in a row, were voted the best domestic airline in the Conde Nast Traveler Business 
Traveler Awards. In 2006, they earned the "Passenger Service Award'' from Air Transport 
World.  
 
Service 
JetBlue focus on service is evidenced by their devotion and attention to hire 
crewmembers that will treat customers in a friendly and respectful manner. The 
importance of providing caring customer service is also emphasized in training. In 
addition, JetBlue policies and procedures are designed to be customer-friendly. For 
example:  
• Pre-assigned seating arrangement;  
• All travel is ticketless;  
• Policy of not overbooking flights;  
• Fares are low and based on one-way travel;  
• No Saturday night stay is required; and  
• Low change fees.  
 
Human Resource Management & Development 
JetBlue conduct careful and rigorous screening of potential employee using tools such as 
behavioral interviews and peer assessments. JetBlue assist their employees by offering 
them flexible work hours, initial paid training, free uniforms and benefits. JetBlue also 
provide extensive training for their pilots, flight attendants, technicians, airport agents, 
 
 
 
- 31 - 
dispatchers and reservation agents which emphasize the importance of safety. An 
important part of their business plan is to reward employee by allowing them to share in 
JetBlue success and align personal successes with those of JetBlue. JetBlue compensation 
packages include competitive salaries, wages and benefits, profit sharing and an 
employee stock purchase plan. In addition, a significant number of their employees 
participate in the stock option plan. Regular human resource policies reviews are 
conducted to ensure that JetBlue remain competitive and are able to hire and retain the 
best people. 
 
Technology Development 
As a new airline, JetBlue have made use of advanced technology in many ways. For 
instance, they are the first US airline to introduce the ‘paperless cockpit’. Pilots use 
mobile laptop in the cockpit to calculate the weight and balance and takeoff performance 
of the aircraft prior to departure. These laptops also allow the pilots to access manuals in 
an electronic format during the flight. In addition, all of JetBlue travel is ticketless, saving 
on distribution cost. In response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, JetBlue 
commenced installation of four cabin security cameras on each of aircraft. JetBlue also 
introduced innovative customer self-service kiosks for check-in. 
 
Firm Infrastructure 
JetBlue have a proven management team which has significant airline industry 
experience, including experience at successful low cost airlines, such as Southwest 
Airlines. JetBlue Chief Executive Officer, David Neeleman, was also instrumental in 
developing the Open Skies reservation system.  
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From above analysis of JetBlue annual reports from 2002 to 2005 (jetblue.com) using 
Porter’s value chain framework, we could identify the sources of JetBlue’s competitive 
strength. This competitive strength permits JetBlue to achieve profitability within their 
first year of operation and reported an operating margin of 16.5% in 2002, the highest of 
any domestic U.S. airline. JetBlue differentiated product, which include new planes, more 
comfortable leather seats, free direct satellite television programming for every passenger, 
lower fares and friendly service raised the competitive bar against other airlines which 
were crippled by the tragic September 11 terrorist event that brought a sudden downturn 
in demand for air travel. Many Airlines are reaching the point where it will be impossible 
to raise prices, grow the top line, or even significantly reduce costs. There are no 
strategies for creating wealth in the long term. The challenge is how to use innovation to 
reinvent the core of your business in a world where strategies die faster than they used to 
and where any business that's not constantly renewing itself is simply becoming 
irrelevant. One misconception about innovation is that it is only about the top line. 
However, Kirkpatrick and Hamel (2004) argue that a lot of the most profound business 
model innovation over the last few years, has been focused on radical cost-structure 
changes, citing JetBlue as the example. JetBlue’s successful implementation of their 
business strategies allow it to remains profitable and competitive, contrary to Porter’s 
view. 
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Food Chain Riding on LCC Growth 
The low cost airline growth is going to drive up demand in other key sectors such as 
aircraft manufacturers, aircraft engine manufacturers, aircraft leasing companies, aircraft 
maintenance companies and airports.     
Aircraft Manufacturers 
 Boeing latest estimates shows the global airline industry will need another 27,000 new 
airplanes in the next twenty years by year 2025 and 34% of these deliveries will be to the 
low cost or short haul carriers. The need by new LCC entrant to expand the existing fleet 
quickly to meet growing demand, plus the need by incumbent LCC to replace older 
aircrafts with newer, more fuel market demand for narrow-body aircraft. While Airbus 
has been steadily gaining market share with the A320 families of aircraft in Asia over 
Boeing’s B737 aircraft, both Airbus and Boeing as the two major global manufacturers of 
narrow-body aircraft, should benefit from the strong LCC growth in Asia. Airbus latest 
Global Market Forecast has a more conservative outlook, predicting a demand for only 
17,300 new passenger and freighter efficient aircraft, will creates a rising aircraft but also 
predicted a 34% deliveries will be to the low cost or short haul operators.    
 
 
 
 
- 34 - 
Exhibit 5 
New Planes Deliveries by Operating Segments 
 
 
Source: Boeing 
Aircraft Maintenance 
Demand for MRO (maintenance, repair and overhaul) services will rise sharply with the 
increased number of aircraft and higher aircraft utilization. Major OEM with component 
repair and overhaul centers in Asia, are well placed to gain from the MRO opportunities 
in the ASEAN and Indian markets given that most are located in Singapore. Operators 
favor the proximity of the MRO service providers as this will reduce aircrafts and 
components turnaround times. This will lead to reduction of inventories to meet the 
aircraft maintenance requirements. In the ASEAN region, Singapore government is 
aiming to be the aviation hub for aerospace MRO services for both full-service and low 
cost carriers. 
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Airports 
A study by Morgan Stanley forecast LCCs to grow the number of aircraft and passengers 
carried at a CAGR of 20%-plus for the next five years. The strong aircraft and passenger 
volume growth will be positive for the aeronautical and commercial revenues and 
earnings of airports. In particular, Singapore Changi Airport and Airports of Thailand, as 
they emerge as key LCC hubs, as potential beneficiaries of the LCC growth in the 
ASEAN market.  
  
Potential Losers 
The appearance of the LCCs has significantly increased competition within the airline 
industry and forced legacy full-service network airlines to reassess and improve their own 
operations. However, while the larger LCCs have been very successful in creating a niche 
for themselves, the low profitability or losses of many smaller LCCs suggests that an 
effective airline strategy, rather than just the LCC model by itself, is the key to success. 
The legacy airlines that are most at risk from the sustainable low-fare environment 
created by low cost airlines are:   
  
• Airlines that are in poor financial health, with high unit operating costs and are unable 
to lower their operating costs, or raise labor productivity.   
• Airlines that generate low percentage of revenue from long-haul sector flights and 
compete directly with LCCs for short-sector routes.   
• Airlines that do not have cargo and other operating revenues to compensate for the 
low fares from short-sector flights. There could be a consolidation in the Asia airline 
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industry, if oil prices remain high at more than US$50/bbl for the next two to three 
years, and/or there is an external macro shock to the airline industry, particularly for 
the weaker and less established LCC brands. The brutal competitive environment will 
make certain that only the airlines with the best business models will outlast the 
competitors and win market share in long term.   
 
Gold at the End of the Rainbow 
In Asia, many new entrepreneurs are starting low cost carriers to chase for the pot of gold 
at the end of the rainbow. Sir Richard Branson, the flamboyant British entrepreneur was 
the first kid off the block in Asia. With A$10 million investment, he started Virgin Blue 
venture in Australia in the third quarter of 2000 with a fleet of B737-400. Followed 
closely behind was Tony Fernandez, who took control of AirAsia in Malaysia, through 
Tune Air in December 2001. The capital investment in AirAsia is about US$21 million. 
Virgin Blue and AirAsia shares were listed in late 2003 and 2004 respectively. With 
market capitalization of US$1.4 billion for Virgin Blue and US$1.0 billion for AirAsia, 
the two initial investors in the companies derived huge returns on their investments. Since 
then, there are Tiger Air, Valuair and JetStar Asia (Valuair has since merged with JetStar 
Asia in July 2005), which operate out of Singapore. In other part of Asia, many LCC are 
beginning to emerge, such as Lion Air, Adam Air, Thai AirAsia, Oasis Airways, Go Air, 
Kingfisher Airlines etc and many more.  
 
 
 
 
- 37 - 
Conclusions 
The two LCC business models of value based and deep discount differ primarily in the 
cost structure. The key question is whether consumer factor in value for money when they 
travel or they opt for the cheapest fare. In line with European and US markets, the latter is 
favored, especially for leisure travel market. The Asian travelers would also be no 
different and would lean towards the same mindset of choosing the cheapest fares. 
Therefore, cost efficiency becomes an important element to enable an airline to compete 
and survive. However, this does not mean that every airline should seek to be the lowest 
cost operator. Instead, it is essential that the costs appropriate for the standard of service 
provided to the customer are achieved in the most efficient manner. Just as Ryanair & 
easyJet experiences have demonstrated in Europe.  
 
In ASEAN, the market is already crowded with 11 players, and additional LCCs could 
enter the market despite the overcrowded field. With the overall global airline industry 
forecasting to lose at least US$1.7 billion in 2006 and operating margins remaining well 
below its cost of capital of 7-8% (IATA, 2006). Will the entrepreneurs dream remains just 
a dream? From the US & European experiences, strong price competition has meant that 
only a handful LCCs have been profitable, while several other LCCs have seen low 
profitability or even turn in losses. The LCC business model by itself is not a guarantor of 
success. It is the individual airline’s strategy that is the key, regardless of the region that 
the LCC operate in. New or small LCC airlines in Asia must learn to adapt to the tough 
operating environments, just as JetBlue profound business model innovation has allowed 
JetBlue to adapt to the external environment and be profitable from the first year of 
operations. It is crucial that the LCC’s own strategy and value proposition fit the target 
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customers in order to compete successfully and be profitable. The next chapter will 
examine closely the Asian market environment and verify if there is a potential market for 
LCC operators.  
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MARKET POTENTIAL FOR ASIAN LCC 
Introduction 
Air travel makes it possible for people to travel. The reasons people travel range from the 
needs to visit friends and relatives, enjoying a relaxing break away from home, to do 
business in distant cities, or the transportation of goods by air to bring to us the things that 
we need and want from around the globe. With global economic growth and the trend 
towards reducing regulation of air travel markets, demand for air transport will rise.  
Asia has a huge population base but very low market penetration by low cost airlines. In 
Asia, 268 cities have over half a million inhabitants compared with 159 cities in Europe 
and 70 cities in the US (Exhibit 6).  
 
Exhibit 6: Metropolitan Areas Population > 500,000 
Region Number Total Population 
Europe 159 251 million 
United States 70 182 million 
China 114 181 million 
Other North Asia 25 86 million 
Southeast Asia 38 97 million 
West Asia 91 191 million 
   
All Asian Metros 268 555 million 
 
Source: Center for Asia Pacific Aviation 
 
 
 
Despite the huge population base in Asia, and the rising per capita income in the region, 
the market penetration by low cost airlines in Asia is only about 3% (if we exclude 
Australia) versus 23% and 16% for US and Europe, respectively, according to Airbus’s 
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estimate (see Exhibit 7). This chapter will look at the factors driving the LCC penetration 
and provides an analysis of the external environment and the LCC market potential. The 
environment analysis will provide insight to this region unique political, economics, 
social and technology dynamics.  
 
There are four factors which have been identified to contribute to such huge passenger 
growth for the low cost airlines in the Asia Pacific region for the next five to ten years. 
The factors driving the air travel demand include the huge population base over a wide 
geographical landscape, stable economic growth, relatively low market LCC penetration 
and rapid growth of LCC due to the air service liberalization. These factors will be 
discussed in details in this chapter.  
 
 
Exhibit 7: LCC Market Shares by Region 
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Huge Population Size and Massive Land Area 
Stable annualized growth rate for the population of Asia Pacific (including Australia and 
New Zealand) was 1.4% for 1990-2000, down from 1.8% for 1980-1990. For 2000-2010, 
the forecast growth rate by the United States Census Bureau is 1.1% for Asia Pacific. If 
China is excluded, the forecast growth rate is 1.5%, higher than the 1.1% expected for the 
world (Exhibit 8). Asia’s huge population base, particularly China and India, accounted 
for about 56% of the world population (only 19% when China and India are excluded). 
The two Asian giants have been in the midst of an economic expansion that is projected 
to turn them into the world’s largest consumer markets within 25 years. 
  
Exhibit 8 
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Stable and High-Speed Economic Growth 
The travel industry will potentially be reshaped by emerging markets in Asia such as 
China and India. Their combined purchasing power could be five times greater than that 
of the United States of America today. Steady economic development in Asia and China 
entry into the World Trade Organization will fuel demand for commercial airplane. On 
top of that, the Chinese government’s decision to develop the western region of the 
country and the success of Beijing’s bid to host the 2008 Olympics will also boost 
demand. In a market analysis by Boeing (2005), the Southeast & Southwest Asia and 
China is expected to be growing much faster than the forecasted world GDP growth of 
2.9%. GDP for these regions is forecast to grow more than 4 percent annually over the 
next 20 years, which is above the world average of 2.9 percent. Annual air travel growth 
is expected to be above the world average of 4.8 percent (Exhibit 9). 
 
Exhibit 9 
   
Source: Boeing 
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A study conducted by DRI.WEFA Forecasting Group has shown that air travel is highly 
correlated to economic growth measured as GDP (Exhibit 10). Increase international 
trade within Asia and globally couple with lower airfare, improved network connections 
and more direct flights would drive air travel. 
 
Exhibit 10 
 
 
Today, every US citizen travels on average 2.2 air trips each year (Exhibit 11). The 
equivalent figures are just 0.02 trips per year for India and 0.06 for China. As incomes 
grow and air travel becomes affordable for more and more people, there will therefore be 
huge potential for air travel growth by these and other emerging and developing 
countries. The escalating population growth rate and growing affluence should induce 
strong growth in air travel for the Asian market, emulating the trend of developed 
countries as shown in Exhibit 11. Increase international trade and lower fares as a result 
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of low cost carrier competition will also drive air travel, as do airline network 
improvements such as increased frequencies and more direct service. 
 
Exhibit 11 
 
Source: Airbus 
 
Low Market Penetration by LCCs in Asia 
It has been estimated in a study by Morgan Stanley that the percentage of the Asia Pacific 
population that has traveled by air is about 3.5%, in contrast to an estimated 9-11% for 
the world population in 2004 (Exhibits 12 and 13). In the more developed countries like 
the US, the UK, France, Ireland and Germany, Morgan Stanley research showed that 
more than 20% of the population has traveled by air, and the two city-states of Singapore 
and Hong Kong also have high percentages of their population that are air travelers. The 
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Asian aviation market, outside the more developed countries of Singapore, Hong Kong 
and Japan, is immature relative to the US and European aviation markets. This indicates 
an untapped potential in the emerging Asian economies. 
 
 Exhibit 12 
 
 
Exhibit 13 
 
 
Progressive Liberalization in Asia Pacific 
Liberalization has also begun to take shape in Asian skies. Progressive liberalization of 
Asian skies is anticipated to follow a process similar to the deregulation experience of the 
United States and European aviation skies. ASEAN skies will be liberalized in 2008, and 
 
 
 
- 46 - 
Thailand and China reached a similar liberal bilateral agreement in 2004. Malaysia and 
Hong Kong also signed an open capacity agreement for both passenger and cargo flights 
to operate between the two countries. It is likely that there will be further moves to 
liberalize traffic rights as other Asian countries explore either open skies or generous 
bilateral rights arrangements in line with the expansion of market demand. South Asia 
also appears to be making some gestures towards aviation liberalization. India achieves 
major milestones in its aviation history when it signs liberalized aviation agreements with 
China, UK, and US earlier this year. The political forces have wake up to the potential 
benefits of increased trade and travel as the airline industry becomes more liberalized. A 
recent study of specific markets around the world that have been liberalized showed that 
this typically stimulates immediate growth of around 12-35 percent. 
  
Rapid Growth for Low cost Airlines  
Two of the world’s most populated countries with huge domestic markets, India and 
China, could provide significant growth opportunities for low cost airlines. North Asia, 
however, remains a difficult market for low cost airlines to penetrate but this perception 
could change over time as North Asian governments examine the tradeoff between lost 
benefits of tourism dollars and restrictive bilateral aviation policies.  
 
To take advantage of market liberalization in the Asian skies, LCCs in Asia Pacific have 
placed large narrow-body aircraft orders for delivery over the next five years. Based on 
the announced aircraft orders, it is anticipated the aircraft fleet for Asia Pacific LCCs will 
more than double to 463 aircrafts in 2008 from 209 aircraft in 2004. If the announced but 
not yet firm aircraft orders are factor in, the number of aircraft increases to 555 and could 
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be higher over the next 12 months as more LCCs enter the market. For India, it is 
determine that there will be 224 aircraft in 2008 with the announced start up of at least 6 
new airlines, compared with only 12 aircraft in 2004. This is with the assumption that all 
aircraft orders by Indian LCCs are taken up.  
 
As Asian skies are liberalized, we project passenger growth for the Asia Pacific market 
could increase at a rate of 7.5% a year for the next five years, assuming there are no 
external macro shocks to the airline industry. It is anticipated that low cost airlines will 
drive the growth with new first time travelers, and a study by Morgan Stanley’s 
simulation model projects a CAGR of 20% for the next five years. The huge increase in 
narrow-body aircraft ordered supports the 20% growth forecast in passengers carried but 
the impact of lower fares and yield, especially on the short-sector flights, will be negative 
for full-service carriers.  
 
The sharp increase in LCCs in the Asian aviation market as a result of progressive 
deregulation will drive strong passenger growth for the coming years. Morgan Stanley 
estimated recently that 5.1 percent of Asia Pacific population would be traveling by air by 
2010, and this implies a CAGR of 7.5% for the next six years (Exhibit 14).  
Exhibit 14 
Base Case scenario: Target 5.1% of Asia Pacific Population Travel by Air
Asia Pacific 
Population
% Population 
travel Passenger Carried % Growth
2003P 3,589 3.44% 282 2.6%
2004P 3,628 3.53% 293 3.9%
2005E 3,668 3.74% 313 6.8%
2006E 3,708 3.98% 337 7.7%
2007E 3,749 4.26% 365 8.3%
2008E 3,790 4.55% 394 7.9%
2009E 3,832 4.83% 423 7.4%
2010E 3,874 5.10% 451 6.6%
CAGR 2004-2010 (%) 1.1% 7.5%
Note: Population projected based on US Census Bureau 2000-2010 Asia population growth rate estimate of 1.1%
E= Estimate
Sources: AAPA, US Census Bureau, International Programs Center, International Data Base, Morgan Stanley  
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The base case indicates the number of passengers in Asia Pacific could reach 451 million 
in 2010.  Under the best case, there is an upside of 531 million passengers based on 6.0% 
of the Asia Pacific population traveling by air that implies a CAGR of 10.4% (Exhibit 
15).  
 
Exhibit 15  
Best Case Scenario: Target 6% of Asia Pacific Population Travel by Air 
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Note: Population projected based on US Census Bureau 2000-2010 Asia population growth rate estimate of 1.1%  
E= Estimate     
Sources: AAPA, US Census Bureau, International Programs Center, International Data Base, Morgan Stanley Analysis 
   
 
 
In the event of a slowing global economy, the worst case is for 372 million passengers, 
based on 4.2% of the Asia Pacific population traveling by air which implies a CAGR of 
4.0% (Exhibit 16). 
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Exhibit 16 
Worst Case Scenario: Target 4.2% of Asia Pacific Population Travel by Air 
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Note: Population projected based on US Census Bureau 2000-2010 Asia population growth rate estimate of 1.1%  
E= Estimate     
Sources: AAPA, US Census Bureau, International Programs Center, International Data Base, Morgan Stanley Analysis 
    
 
Projected Market Potential for LCCs 
For the next six years (2004-2010), the number of passengers for the Asia Pacific aviation 
market could increase to a range of 372 million and 531 million, or an implied annual 
compounded growth rate (CAGR) of 4-10%, from an estimated base of 293 million in 
2004. For the past six years (1998-2004), the CAGR for Asia Pacific passengers was 
3.2%. Full-service carriers drove the growth rate because low cost airlines did not have a 
meaningful presence in Asia prior to 2004.  For the past four years (2000-2004), the 
CAGR was higher at 4.3%. The normalized passenger growth rate for full service carriers 
is about 6-7% (versus the sub-par growth rate of 3.2% of the past six years), if the 
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external macro shock events of the Asian economic crisis (1997/98), 9/11 terrorist attacks 
(2001) and the SARS outbreaks (2003) were excluded. With the assumption of full-
service carriers growing at an annualized rate of 6.5% for the next six years (2004-2010), 
this would means that the LCCs would potentially grow at a CAGR of 20.5% and would 
increase the market share of an estimated 5.4% in 2004 to 11.1% by 2010, based on 
Morgan Stanley base case scenario (Exhibit 17). 
 
Exhibit 17 
Asia Pacific LCC Market Share
Network Low Cost Market Penetration*
2004 278 15 5.40%
2005 296 17 5.74%
2006E 315 21 6.67%
2007E 336 29 8.63%
2008E 358 36 10.06%
2009E 381 42 11.02%
2010E 406 45 11.08%
CAGR 2004-2010 (%) 6.5% 20.5%
* Includes the low cost airlines in Australia
E = Estimates Sources: Morgan Stanley
Passengers Carried (Mil)
 
 
In contrast, the passenger market shares of LCCs in the US and European aviation 
markets were about 16% and 23%, respectively, in 2004, according to Airbus’ estimates 
(Exhibit 7). In the four European countries where LCCs have dominant market shares the 
UK, Italy, Germany and France the estimated shares for LCCs are about 19% of the 
domestic market and 24% of the intra-European routes. The UK market has the highest 
market penetration by LCCs in Europe 31% for the domestic market and 35% for the 
intra-Europe market and this can be attributed to the highly successful strategies of 
Ryanair and easyJet.  
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Conclusion 
Asia Pacific, a far-flung region that stretches from Northeast Asia to New Zealand and 
across to India, which accounts for 56% of the world population and favorable macro 
environments coupled with a large growing affluent population will fuel new demand for 
discretionary travel. Asian LCC with the right business model and strategies will 
definitely ride on this huge potential for discretionary air travel and emulate the success 
exhibit in North American and Europe. Although the pace of bilateral liberalization is 
spreading at a much slower pace than in other markets around the world, the emergence 
of low cost carriers in Asia Pacific is accelerating this trend.  
 
Within Asia, China and India could provide a bright prospect for budding LCC 
entrepreneurs. Many aspiring entrepreneurs have place big orders for airplanes to start 
LCC operation there. In 2004, it is estimated that the passenger market share for low cost 
airlines in the Asian aviation market was about 2-3%. If Australia is included, the market 
share is estimated to be about 5%. The low-cost airlines could increase their share of the 
Asia Pacific aviation market, which includes Japan and Australia to about 11% in 2010, 
and could reach higher rates if external macro environment remains favorable. This is 
very conservative outlook compares with current rates of 23% for Europe and 16% for the 
US market in 2004. The combination of progressive liberalization, vast growing affluent 
population, improve airplane capabilities will shape the airline strategies going forward.  
 
The next chapter will examine the type of airplane used by LCC and what the future look 
likes for the two dominant aircrafts manufacturers who have employed a combination of 
product and marketing strategies to race against each other to become the supplier of 
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choice for this market segment. It will also review the future aircraft deliveries to various 
LCC operators. 
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Asia Pacific Airlines Fleet Analysis 
Introduction 
This chapter will examine the aircraft deliveries to various LCC operators and the aircraft 
market trend. This will help to understand the potential beneficiaries of LCC growth in 
later chapter. In 2004, the Asia Pacific traditional full-service airline industry, excluding 
airlines in China, operated a fleet of 1,177 aircraft. The growth in aircraft numbers for 
Asian airlines has been in the low single digit since the Asian economic crisis in 1997. 
This is due in parts to Airlines accelerating the retirement of older inefficient aircraft to 
cut capacity in the aftermath of September 11th terrorist attacks in 2001 and SARS 
outbreak in 2003. Overall in the past ten years from 1994-2004, the average annual 
compounded growth rate (CAGR) was 2.1% for the Asia Pacific passenger plane fleet 
(Exhibit 18).  
 
Exhibit 18 
Asia Pacific Passenger Plane Fleet – 1994-2004 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
CAGR 
94-04
Aircraft 964 1,014 1,100 1,153 1,181 1,198 1,133 1,180 1,128 1,145 1,177 2.1%
% Change 5.2% 8.5% 4.8% 2.4% 1.4% -5.4% 4.1% -4.4% 1.5% 2.8%
Seat Capacity (E) 257,311 280,478 303,811 320,762 323,799 322,465 321,980 333,934 322,775 327,607 331,949 2.6%
% Change 9.0% 8.3% 5.6% 0.9% -0.4% -0.2% 3.7% -3.3% 1.5% 1.3%  
Source: AAPA E=Estimate 
 
In terms of aircraft seats capacity added over the past ten years, it is estimate the CAGR 
was about 2.6%, and higher than the aircraft growth rate of 2.0%, due to the strong 
growth in the number of wide body airplanes in the region. More interestingly, over the 
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past five years (1999-2004), the number of passenger aircraft dropped by 1.8% to 1,177 
while the total number of estimated seats rose by 2.9% to 331,949 in 2004.  
 
In the next four years from (2005 to 2009), the full-service carriers are to add 284 aircraft, 
or a CAGR of 5.5%. Based on the announced aircraft orders, LCCs will add 246 aircraft 
for a CAGR of 20.5% (Exhibit 19). One of the two major LCCs in Singapore, newly 
merged JetStar (Ex-JetStar Asia & Valuair) have yet to announce their aircraft order 
plans, and the aircraft order book could swell considerably if they start to order new 
airplane. Moreover, with more new entrants in India and China, more recently, in Korea, 
we believe the potential new aircraft orders from LCCs will be higher than the 20% 
growth rate that is based on announced orders data tracked by ACAS. 
 
Exhibit 19: Asia Pacific Aircraft Fleet – 2004-2009E 
Asia Pacific Aircraft Fleet - 2004-2009E
2004 2005 2006E 2007E 2008E 2009E
04-08E 
CAGR
Network Carrier 1,177 1,197 1,294 1,363 1,423 1,481 5.5%
Low Cost Carrier 209 277 351 409 463 525 20.5%
Total 1,386 1,474 1,645 1,772 1,886 2,006
Network Carrier 84.9% 81.2% 78.7% 76.9% 75.4% 73.8%
Low Cost Carrier 15.1% 18.8% 21.3% 23.1% 24.5% 26.2%
Source: AAPA, ACAS  
 
More Good News at Air Show 
At the recent Farnborough Air Show in July 2006, Lion Air, a low cost airline in 
Indonesia, announced an order for another 30 B737-900 aircraft for US$2.2 billion. The 
airline placed an initial order for 30 aircraft back in July 2005 and this brings their total 
order to 60 aircrafts. Lion Air will receive their first aircraft from 2007 onwards. 
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Malaysia AirAsia, the region fastest growing successful low cost airlines also placed an 
additional order for 40 A320s. This brings their total orders for the A320 family aircraft 
to 100, and estimated to worth US$6.4 billion at catalogue price. Another low cost airline, 
Go Air, a new LCC start up in India, also placed an order for 10 A320s. Earlier this year, 
Virgin Blue, the early LCC entrant in Asia, has exercises its purchase rights for another 
additional 9 B737-800 to expand its fleet. SpiceJet, another low cost airline in India, also 
announced at the show for an order for 10 B737 next generation aircraft. 
    
Aircraft Lessors Riding on LCC Boom 
As of June 2006, there are 28 LCCs operating in the Asia Pacific market (see Appendix 1 
for the list of LCCs) with 279 aircraft, and the number of LCCs and aircraft orders has 
been rising, as more LCCs enter the market and order more aircraft. About 75% of the 
LCC aircraft are on operating leases, and the relatively high number of operating leased 
aircraft suggests a low level of upfront capital and plays a part for the relative ease of 
establishing new LCCs in the Asia Pacific aviation market. This compares with only 39% 
of the narrow-body aircraft on operating leases for Asia Pacific airlines.  
 
The number of LCCs in Asia had risen to about 26 at the end of 2005 and this could be 
higher if we include China LCC. At the latest tally exercise in June 2006, the 28 LCCs 
exclude associates or subsidiaries of the parent company. For example, Thai AirAsia and 
Indonesia AirAsia are associates of AirAsia, and JetStar Asia has common parentage with 
JetStar in Qantas. With an operating aircraft fleet of 209, the LCCs had about 15% of the 
aircraft fleet in Asia Pacific at end of 2004 (Exhibit 19). However, as the LCCs operate 
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with smaller narrow-body aircraft, it is estimate the market share for LCCs, based on 
available seats, is only about 8%.    
 
Up till the end of Farnborough Air Show 2006, the announced aircraft fleet by both full-
service and low cost carriers is estimate that the LCCs will have about 26% of the aircraft 
fleet by 2009 (Exhibit 19).  If major LCCs in Singapore such as JetStar and other regional 
LCC start-ups begin to order new aircraft, it is not hard to imagine that the aircraft fleet 
operated by the LCCs could expand to a market share in excess of 26% on the Asia 
Pacific aircraft fleet in 2009. At the Paris Air Show in 2005, the Indian airline carriers 
placed orders for 213 aircraft valued at US$23.9 billion from Airbus, Boeing and 
Empresa Brasileira de Aeronautica, making the country the biggest buyer of planes in the 
region. Kingfisher Airlines and other low cost airlines in India made up 28% of the 
aircraft orders and commitments for Airbus and Boeing planes.  
 
Shift in Low Cost Airlines Aircraft Choices 
The top six LCCs in Asia Pacific, AirAsia, Virgin Blue, Air Deccan, IndiGo, Cebu 
Pacific and the restructure JetStar are expected to have 294 aircraft (or 69% of the LCC 
aircraft fleet in 2009 and beyond, up from 118 aircraft or 56% of the aircraft fleet in 2004 
(Exhibit 20). Two of the top six LCCs, Cebu Pacific and Air Deccan currently use a 
majority of smaller DC9 and ATR42/72 aircraft, respectively, in contrast to the standard 
and more efficient B737 or A320 aircraft operated by the LCCs in US and European 
markets. However, this trend of using smaller aircraft in Asia will gradually change as the 
airport infrastructure are upgraded and both Cebu Pacific and Air Deccan take delivery of 
14 A319/A320 aircraft and 51 A320 aircraft, respectively, by 2009. 
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Exhibit 20  
 
Top LCC Fleet in Asia, 2005-2009E 
Operator 2005 2006E 2007E 2008E 2009E
AIR DECCAN 7 20 31 41 51
AIRASIA 21 32 44 56 76
THAI AIRASIA 10 10 10 10 10
INDONESIA AIRASIA 4 6 6 6 6
CEBU PACIFIC AIR 18 20 22 22 22
INDIGO 0 6 15 23 29
JETSTAR 33 38 40 40 40
VIRGIN BLUE AIRLINES 47 47 47 53 60
Total 140 179 215 251 294  
 Source: ACAS, 2006 
 
In 2005, the LCCs in Asia Pacific operated with more B737 than A320 family type of 
aircraft (Exhibit 21).  Boeing aircraft accounted for 53% of the 277 aircraft operated by 
the LCCs while Airbus had only about 20% share of the Asia Pacific market. The B737 
aircraft dominated Asia Pacific LCCs with 149 aircraft or 53% of the market in 2005, 
with Virgin Blue and AirAsia being the key customers for the B737 aircraft.  
 
Exhibit 21: Asia Pacific Fleet Composition in 2005  
Asia Pacific LCC Fleet Composition in 2005
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Source: ACAS, 2006 
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However, when the recent aircraft orders by the Asian low cost carriers are added, it is 
projected that Airbus will overtake Boeing to be the narrow-body aircraft of choice after 
2009 (Exhibit 22) in Asia Pacific. Based on ACAS database, Airbus will have 49% of the 
market share in 2009, operating 250 A319/320/A321 aircraft among 525 aircraft. Boeing 
will probably see its market share of B737 diluted to 41%.  
 
Exhibit 22: Asia Pacific Aircraft Fleet Composition in 2009E 
Asia Pacific LCC Fleet Composition in 2009 
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Source: ACAS, 2006 
 
The possible reason for Airbus success in the Asia Pacific low cost airline market is due 
to the aggressive use of lessors to promote the A320 aircraft to new LCC start-ups. As 
indicated in Exhibit 23, seven of the new Asia Pacific LCCs in 2004 leased the A320 
aircraft from various leasing companies before ending up purchasing the A320 aircraft to 
fuel their growth expansion. Boeing on the other hand, is not going to concede defeat as 
yet as the orders books is beginning to fill up again in the recent Farnborough Air show. 
Boeing is aggressively marketing their B737 Next-Generation aircraft. Boeing believe 
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their product is more superior as it is at least 10 years younger than the A320 and 
therefore the B737NG offer the customer with more advance technologies, lower 
operating costs, greater range, faster cruise speed and a new interior. 
 
Exhibit 23 
Low Cost Carrier Utilized Lessors Aircraft during Launch Phase  
Leased Owned Grand Total
Operator A319 A320 A319 A320
AIR DECCAN 14 14
GOAIR 3 3
JETSTAR ASIA AIRWAYS 4 4
KINGFISHER AIRLINES 3 7 1 1 12
STAR FLYER 3 3
TIGER AIRWAYS 6 6
VALUAIR 4 4
Grand Total 3 41 1 1 46  
Source: ACAS, Hamilton Sundstrand Analysis  
 
Narrow-Body Aircraft Engine Choices  
Boeing B737 and B737NG are power by CFM company CFM56-3 and CFM56-7 engines 
respectively. CFM international is a joint venture company between Snecma, France and 
General Electric Co., U.S.A. While the Airbus A320 aircraft has a choice of engine 
configuration and is power by either the CFM56-5 or International Aero Engine (IAE) 
V2500 engine. IAE comprises a few shareholders, Pratt & Whitney; Rolls-Royce; 
Japanese Aero Engines Corp. (JAEC); and MTU Aero Engines. The partners signed an 
agreement in 1983 to develop and produce turbofan engines known as the V2500 family. 
The growth of LCC has brings cheers to these 2 engines companies. Currently IAE has 82 
engines flying on the A320 family aircraft on various LCCs (exclude China), and CFM 
has only 18 engines in operation (Exhibit 24). In 2009, IAE will have 175 engines in 
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operation as compared to CFM engine population of 75 on the A320 aircraft. When the 
recent aircraft orders by the Asian low cost carriers are added, it is projected that CFM 
will have a huge lead over IAE and becomes the narrow-body aircraft engine of choice 
with a total population of 269 engines by 2009 (Exhibit 24). Based on ACAS database, 
CFM will have 58% of the market share in 2009, while IAE will have 37%.  
 
Exhibit 24: Engine Market Share in 2006 vs. 2009 
Engine Market Share in 2006
CFM56-3, 80, 30%
CFM56-5, 18, 7%
CFM56-7, 66, 25%
JT8D, 21, 8%
V2500, 82, 30%
CFM56-3 CFM56-5 CFM56-7 JT8D V2500
Engine Market Share in 2009
CFM56-3, 80, 17%
CFM56-5, 75, 16%
CFM56-7, 114, 25%JT8D, 21, 5%
V2500, 175, 37%
CFM56-3 CFM56-5 CFM56-7 JT8D V2500  
 
Source: ACAS, Hamilton Sundstrand Analysis    
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Conclusion 
Low cost carriers accounts for about 8% of the available seats in the Asia Pacific aviation 
market and about 15% of the aircraft market share. However, LCCs are to put aircraft into 
service at about four times the rate of the full service network airlines over the next four 
years (2005-2009) and are expected to account for about 26% of the aircraft fleet by 
2009. This market trend will greatly benefit the aerospace industry suppliers and aircraft 
lessors. Aircraft manufacturer such as Airbus and Boeing, with well position product lines 
will continue to grab the lion share of the aircraft orders. Downstream suppliers to the 
aircraft manufacturer such as manufacturers for aircraft engines and aircraft systems will 
benefit as well. For the narrow-body aircraft engine manufacturer, it is projected that both 
International Aero Engine and CFM International will benefit greatly from the LCC boom 
with market share of 37% and 58% respectively. As more and more LCCs enter the 
profitable Asia Pacific market or expand their fleet to build economy of scale, there could 
be great prospect for the aerospace vendors to see a much higher number of aircraft 
deliveries, exceeding the annualized growth rate of 20%.  
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Review of Asian Aviation Regulatory Framework 
Introduction 
Today commercial aviation market is still governed largely by outdated regulatory 
framework laid down in the post World War II era. Despite today’s trend toward 
globalization and economic integration, one of the most globalize, technologically driven 
industries remains laden by regulations that suppress competition. This did not allow 
value surpluses created to be passed on to airlines, communities, and passengers. The 
bilateral air service agreements that continue to regulate much of international 
commercial aviation define how the airlines will link their two home territories. These 
barriers often restrict market growth, force consumer to pay a premium for air services, 
and create a series of vested interests. 
 
With great foresight and leadership, United States domestic airline industry was the first 
to undergo dramatic changes through the enactment of the Airline Deregulation Act in 
1978. This led to a large increase in the entry of new airlines, a remarkable change in 
existing airlines' route and fare structures, and a notable increase in the use of air travel 
services. Two important amendments were made which transformed the US Airline 
industry. First, airlines have the liberty of entry and exit on domestic routes. Second, 
airlines were given total autonomy to set fares. After having operated in a tightly 
regulated industry structure, the airline suddenly had to adapt quickly to an intensely 
competitive market. The Airlines’ lower cost structures, more creative management, and 
more efficient aircraft fleets allowed these airlines to ride successfully over the storm in 
the early years. European enjoyed similar benefits when their airline industry marched 
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towards deregulation in the 1990s. However, long protected national flag airlines were 
not so fortunate and some even succumbed to the competitive pressure. Asian 
governments in the region recognize the benefits of liberalized air services. 
Unfortunately, the varying degrees of economic development in different countries also 
place various pressures on governments, limiting their ability to liberalize their air 
transport markets effectively. 
 
Australia vs. Japan Liberalization Experience 
Australia and New Zealand concluded a Single Aviation Market (SAM) agreement, 
effective as of November 1, 1996. The goal of SAM was to bring the two countries closer 
together within the elements of the Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations 
Free Trade Agreement or ANZCERTA. While the SAM agreement opened up many new 
opportunities within the Trans-Tasman market, it did not deal with beyond markets to 
third countries. Those markets were still under the original 1961 Australia – New Zealand 
Air Services Agreement and the subsequent 1992 Memorandum of Understanding. Two 
different definitions of air carriers were created from the agreement: the “Domestic” and 
the “SAM” airline. The Domestic airline designation allowed carriers to fly domestic 
services in each others domestic market and the SAM designation harmonized ownership, 
control, technical and safety certifications from each countries regulatory agencies. The 
slow but progressive liberalization in Asia has been instrumental in attracting new low 
cost airlines into the Asia Pacific aviation market. Since the establishment of SAM in 
1996, the liberalization of the Asia Pacific market has been slow but gradual, with Japan 
opening up the domestic market in 1996 and the premature deregulation of some ASEAN 
markets in 2004.  
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The formation of the single Australia/New Zealand aviation market led to some 
consolidation and resulted in the acquisition of Ansett Australia by Air New Zealand in 
2000. The Air New Zealand/Ansett combination, supported by a 25% strategic equity 
investment in Air New Zealand by Singapore Airlines (SIA), was a serious threat to 
Qantas. However, due to the complicated regulations and political inertia, the SIA group 
was not allowed to increase its stake in the enlarged Air New Zealand group to a more 
significant controlling position. This probably led to the eventual demise of Ansett 
Australia in September 2001 and created a vacuum in the Australian market. After the 
collapse of Ansett Australia, it created an opportunity for Virgin Blue to progress and 
becomes the second dominant carrier in the domestic Australian market.  
 
The new airline, Virgin Blue, has a lower comparative operating cost advantage over 
Ansett and Qantas and quickly gain market share. Prior to the entry of Virgin Blue, the 
Australian domestic market was operated as a duopoly by Qantas and Ansett Australia. 
The high operating cost structure of Ansett, high aircraft leased operating charges and 
expensive unionized labor costs, made it very difficult for Ansett to remain profitable 
when the low cost model hit the Australian marketplace with vengeance in 2000. The 
entry of low cost competitors such as Virgin Blue and Impulse and the aggressive fare 
discounting in the domestic market in early 2001 made it enormously difficult for Ansett 
Australia to stay afloat. Coupled with the dramatic September 11th event that caused 
Ansett and many other airlines to bleed their cash flow at a profusely fast rate due to the 
sudden downturn in international travel, the airline has no choice but to declare bankrupt.  
In Japan, the deregulation in 1986 did not create any real impact until the introduction of 
discount carriers in the domestic market in 1997. Deregulation did not create competition 
within the Japanese aviation market, but it merely reallocate both domestic and 
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international market shares among JAL, ANA and, to some extent, Japan Air System 
(JAS). The three operators behave rationally and expand their capacity in a systematic 
fashion to attain a reasonable traffic growth and profit levels. The domestic market did 
not get a shakeup till late 1996, when the Ministry of Transportation approved the 
opening of new start up airlines in the domestic market. In late 1997, two new carriers, 
Skymark Airlines and Hokkaido International Airlines (also known as Air Do), began 
offering low fares on domestic routes. 
 
Liberalization in the domestic Japanese aviation market has not accomplished the desired 
effect as compared to the Australian aviation market. The two major surviving low cost 
airlines, Skymark and AirDo, and the third LCC Skynet Asia, which enter the market in 
late 2002, have not been successful in penetrating the domestic market. Their combined 
market share is a measly 3.3% as of fiscal year 2003 (Appendix 4) and the main reasons 
are the limiting slots in the Japanese airports and the prevailing control of the incumbent 
network airlines at the airport gates. The merger of JAL and JAS also consolidated the 
incumbent airlines position in the domestic market with both ANA and JAL now 
controlling more than 96.7% of the domestic market.  
 
ASEAN Air Transport Market 
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations or ASEAN was established on 8 August 
1967 in Bangkok by the five original Member Countries, namely, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Today ASEAN has grown to a 10 nations grouping 
with the addition of Brunei, Cambodia, Vietnam, Myanmar and Laos (exhibit 25).  
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Exhibit 25 
ASEAN Map  
 
Source: www.aseansec.org 
 
The ASEAN region has a population of about 500 million, a total area of 4.5 million 
square kilometers, a combined gross domestic product (GDP) of almost US$ 700 billion, 
and a total trade of about US$ 850 billion (See appendix 5 for breakdown by countries). 
This statistics present a huge growth potential for intra-ASEAN air transportation. The 
formation of an ASEAN Economic Community to promote free trade within the ASEAN 
market will be the end-goal of ASEAN economic integration as outlined in the ASEAN 
Vision 2020, a process similar to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA, 
US-Mexico-Canada free trade area) and the European Economic Union (or EEC in 
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Europe). Its goal is to create a stable, prosperous and highly competitive ASEAN 
economic region in year 2020. 
ASEAN attaches great importance to enhancing infrastructure and communications 
connectivity in the realization of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). The AEC’s 
11 priority sectors in regional integration include air travel and tourism. In November 
2004, the 10 ASEAN member countries signed a road map for the integration and 
liberalization of air transport in Southeast Asia under the ASEAN Framework Agreement 
for the Integration of Priority Schedules (ASEAN 2004). The deregulation of air services 
is part of the ASEAN Transport Action Plan to improve the region’s air transport 
infrastructure and logistics network. Article 10 of the Framework Agreement provides for 
expediting the development of integrated transport logistics services within ASEAN, 
particularly for cargo transportation. The more relevant Article 11 provides for the 
facilitation of travel in ASEAN. To hasten the travel process, member countries shall 
harmonize the procedures for the issuance of visas to international travelers in ASEAN in 
late 2004, and have provided visa exemptions for intra-ASEAN travel by ASEAN 
nationals in 2005. 
 
To achieve an integrated economic community within ASEAN, the following steps have 
been developed:  
•setting clear targets and schedules for services liberalization for each sector and each 
round to achieve the free flow of trade in services with the end date earlier than 2020,  
•accelerate services liberalization earlier than the end date by countries which are ready, 
through the application of the ASEAN-X formula; 
•accelerate regional integration in the 11 priority sectors which ASEAN enjoys 
competitive advantage;  
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•accelerate liberalization in these priority sectors by 2010 and promote joint ventures and 
cooperation, including third country markets; and   
•facilitate the movement of business people and tourists. Air travel is one of the 11 
priority sectors that the 10 ASEAN member governments have agreed to liberalize at a 
faster pace in a bid to create an ASEAN Economic Community by 2020. ASEAN 
members recently endorsed a road map for the integration of the air travel sector, which 
targets full liberalization of cargo services and unlimited direct operations to ASEAN 
capitals by December 2008.  
 
The ASEAN Transport Ministers fully recognize the benefits of liberalized air services 
and supported the view that this is the key for ASEAN to integrate with the global 
economy, improve competitiveness and enhance the inflow of foreign direct investment. 
Moreover, the Ministers will work towards developing a regional action plan for staged 
and progressive implementation of open-sky arrangements in ASEAN-member countries.  
 
One of the key action points highlighted in the ASEAN Transport Action Plan for 2005-
2010 is “promoting open sky arrangements by building upon the Roadmap for Integration 
of ASEAN (RIA) for ASEAN Competitive Air Services Policy, including exploiting the 
potential of full air freight services liberalization, through plurilateral or multilateral 
basis, to support increased intra-ASEAN travel, trade and investment (Article 14d).”  The 
key initiatives will be for ASEAN-member countries to open up their skies for both cargo 
and passenger services from 2006 (see Appendix 5 for the Roadmap for Integration of Air 
Travel Sector).  
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For passenger services, the liberalization of the ASEAN aviation market will begin with 
opening fifth freedom or beyond right traffic for all designated points within the ASEAN 
sub-regions.  Simply put, there will be no restriction on the number of flights for an 
ASEAN airline to pick and drop passengers from the designated points in the ASEAN 
sub-regions by 2006. Fifth freedom traffic is not ideal for LCCs but favors the network 
carriers. The liberalization of the ASEAN skies also allows unlimited third and fourth 
freedom traffic (home country to another country and vice versa) for at least two 
designated points in each country between the ASEAN sub-regions at the end of 2006.  
To illustrate, any airlines based in Singapore or in Thailand can operate the Singapore-
Phuket route, and the number of flight frequencies will depend on the airport slot 
availability than on the restrictive bilateral rights. Point-to-point operations (or third and 
fourth freedoms) are ideal for LCC. A detailed definition of freedom traffic for airlines, 
have been attached in Appendix 7.  
 
In 2008, the unlimited point-to-point operation will extend to the capital city in each 
ASEAN member country. An interesting development would be the Kuala Lumpur-
Singapore route, currently one of the most profitable in Asia for both Malaysia Airlines 
(MAS) and Singapore Airlines (SIA). The liberalization of third and fourth freedom 
traffic could entice the entry of low-cost airlines into this sector and drive down the yield 
for this route. In 2010, further liberalization of the ASEAN skies will lead to unlimited 
fifth freedom traffic for the capital city in each ASEAN member country.   
 
Many multilateral agreements have been made between member countries in preparation 
for air transport liberalization. Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Viet Nam signed an 
agreement on air transport in Hanoi in late 2003. Brunei Darussalam, Singapore and 
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Thailand have also reached an agreement on full liberalization of air transportation in late 
2004, ahead of the other members of ASEAN. The agreement allows airlines based in the 
three countries to operate any number of passenger flights between the three countries. 
The competition has led to a sudden increase of inexpensive flights between Thailand and 
Singapore. The “2-plus X” approach, as outlined in the ASEAN Transport Action Plan, 
enables two or more ASEAN member countries to proceed ahead if they are prepared to 
do so earlier than the other member countries. The three-way pact between Singapore, 
Thailand and Brunei demonstrate this approach and will allow the liberalization target to 
be achieved four year ahead of the other member countries.  
 
Air cargo operators have been constraint by the current approach of regulating flights in 
terms of aircraft capacity, frequency and routing. This does not provide the operational 
flexibility that they seek. In view of this, four ASEAN members, which include Thailand, 
Brunei, Singapore and Cambodia, signed a multilateral air cargo open-skies agreement 
that will allow the four countries to operate unlimited all-cargo services among the 
countries, to any third country. Member countries will achieve full liberalization of 
airfreight services by 2008.  
 
Malaysia-Singapore skies are also heading for open sky before 2008. Malaysia and 
Singapore have both welcomed the imminent opening up of two-way air routes, seeing 
mutual benefits in such a development (CNA, 2006). The Kuala Lumpur-Singapore city 
pair route is one of the most protected and lucrative routes in Asia. It has one of the 
highest passenger yields (estimated at US$0.20/RPK) in Asia. The existing air fare costs 
over US$240 for a round trip. Two national flag carriers, MAS and SIA, dominate the 
Kuala Lumpur-Singapore route with 84% of the 184 weekly flights. In contrast, the 
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Singapore-Bangkok sector has 380 weekly flights and fares (starting as low as US$100 
for a round trip) between the two cities have decrease dramatically since the entry of low 
cost airlines such as Tiger Airways, Thai AirAsia and JetStar. Low cost airlines from both 
sides, Malaysia's AirAsia and Singapore's Tiger Airways, have both indicated interest in 
flying the busy Kuala Lumpur-Singapore air route and could erode the high yield for this 
route. To protect themselves ahead of the open skies in 2008, three Airlines, SIA, MAS 
and SilkAir have signed a code sharing agreement for expanded access between 
Singapore and four Malaysian states.  
 
An exception to the liberalization is the Philippines. The country requires more time to 
comply with the air transport integration and liberalization program among ASEAN 
members. The Philippines has applied for the ASEAN-X protocol, which allows ASEAN 
member flexibility in complying with the terms of the air transport program. The airlines 
based in the Philippines have called on the government to delay opening its skies to 
foreign carriers before they become competitive.  
 
Overall, the ASEAN countries are largely liberalizing the international bilateral 
agreements that would allow the regulation of the number and type of aircraft, number of 
seats provided and the fare pricing levels. Recent liberalization trends also cover Thailand 
and China, which have adopted an “open-skies” agreement, allowing unrestricted 
operations between the two countries, while Singapore, Thailand and Brunei are 
negotiating a multi-lateral “open-skies” agreement for passenger flights.  
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South Asia Transport Market 
Liberalization in South Asia is also emerging. India appears to be making some progress 
on this issue, customarily a laggard behind their more dynamic counterparts elsewhere in 
Asia. Earlier this year, India accomplished major milestones in its aviation history when it 
signed liberalized aviation agreements with China, UK, and US. Reflecting the new mood 
of optimism, significant orders for new aircraft deliveries were placed with the two major 
airplane makers by new entrant airlines. Gradual capacity growth has been observed 
between India and key ASEAN cities due to the constraint in airport capacity and other 
bottlenecks. Foreign airlines still do not have free market access in India, while bilateral 
liberalization appears to be highly selective. 
 
China’s Progressive Market Deregulation  
Deregulation of China aviation market has gathered pace since late 2003. In 2004, we saw 
China ease bilateral restrictions considerably with major Asian countries, including 
Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, South Korea, Australia and Japan, as well as with the US 
and Hong Kong (See appendix 8). These liberalized air service agreements include 
expansion of passenger and cargo frequencies, provision for multiple carrier designation, 
and improved access to Chinese destinations for participating airlines. The enlarged 
capacity is strongly sought after by the aviation market players. This could potentially 
drive the fares lower and result in a decrease in yield for the airlines. However, higher 
traffic to and from major Chinese airport hubs will more than compensate for the lower 
yield.   
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Asia is lifting travel restrictions for its populace progressively, particularly for China 
which relaxes the restrictions for its citizens to travel by raising the number of exit visas 
issued for independent and group travel. On May 2, China’s Taiwan Affair Office of the 
State Council granted approval for Chinese tourists to visit Taiwan, starting with a daily 
quota of 1,000 persons per day (or 365,000/year) and increasing to 3,000 persons per day 
(or 1 million/year) in a few years. The liberalization of China’s aviation market will be a 
significant boost to Asia Pacific airlines and a potential goldmine for the low cost airlines. 
As reported by Xin (2006), China will open more overseas and domestic air routes to 
meet traffic demands in the run-up to, and during the 2008 Olympic Games. Currently, 
there are 186 flights from Beijing Capital International Airport to Japan and 154 flights to 
South Korea each week, and the number for these two countries and other Asian nations 
is expected to soar by 2008. 
 
North Asia Market – Difficult for LCCs 
In Asia Pacific, Japan was among the first countries to promote low cost airlines. 
However, the market penetration for the three LCCs is only 3.3% after more than five 
years of operation. Skymark Airlines, which was established in 1996 and is currently 
Japan's largest discount carrier by market share reported its first annual net profit only in 
the year ended 31 October 2004. Hokkaido International Airlines (Air Do), based in 
Sapporo, is undergoing a corporate rehabilitation process and entered into a 
comprehensive alliance with All Nippon Airways to help the carrier restructure. The third 
low cost operator, Skynet Asia commenced domestic services in Japan in August 2002, 
but has encountered financial difficulties and is currently restructuring with support from 
the state-backed Industrial Revitalization Corp. In South Korea, two LCCs (Jeju Air and 
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Hansung Airlines) have announced plans to provide domestic flights in Korea using ATR 
and Bombardier aircraft, with the longer term goal of providing regional flights to China 
and Japan. The business models and goals of these two Korean LCCs look ambitious, 
given the tough competition the low cost airlines will face from Korean Air and Asiana 
Airlines. Low cost airlines faces immense difficulty in competing with the incumbent 
network airlines due to the restrictive bilateral agreements in North Asia, high airport 
landing fees, high labor costs (particularly pilots) and the dominance of incumbent 
carriers in the respective home markets.  
 
Within the Pearl River Delta region, which include Special Administrative Region of 
Hong Kong and Macau, and the eight prefectures of Guangdong province, lays an 
alternate gateway to Hong Kong and into China, i.e. Macau. The airport in Macau could 
evolve to become a major threat for the North Asian network and full service airlines if 
the LCC model established a foothold there. Two Asian LCCs, Air Asia and Tiger 
Airways, have already initiated flights 
into Macau. Both LCCs have intention to 
expand their North Asian regional 
presence by establishing a hub in Macau. 
If Macau becomes a new hub for low 
cost airlines, the North Asian full-service 
airlines could face the same passenger 
yield pressure as experienced by other 
deregulated regions.  
 
 
Exhibit 26  
Map of Pearl River Delta Region 
 
Source: www.wikipedia.org 
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On June 20, 2005, Singapore reached a deal with Hong Kong to allow unlimited 
passenger flights between the two cities. The deal falls short of an open skies agreement, 
which would allow airlines to pick up passengers in Hong Kong and fly them to other 
destinations. The five carriers, which include SIA, Cathay Pacific Airways, JetStar 
(include Valuair), China Airlines and United Airlines currently operate 238 weekly 
passenger flights between the two cities. The new aviation deal will be a significant boost 
for low cost airlines to expand flights between Singapore and Hong Kong. 
 
Conclusion 
The creation of a common Australia/New Zealand aviation market in 1996 was the first 
step towards creating a liberalized aviation market in Asia. InterVISTAS-ga2 Consulting 
study found that each nation gained more than 20,600 full-time positions from the 
liberalization and the ensuing traffic increase. The GDP of each country grew by US$726 
million. By 2005, Australia-New Zealand traffic has increase by 56 percent as compared 
to the period prior to any liberalization. The relaxed market controls facilitates the growth 
of the total passenger traffic by more than 1.7 million a year, and the increase in 
passenger volume would require the airlines to operate another 27 additional flights per 
day. 
 
The Japan market followed the liberalization path in 1996 but the outcome is less certain. 
Unless a genuinely liberalized aviation industry exists within Japan domestic market. It 
would be a challenge for all operators to compete in an environment where consumers, 
rather than politicians or bankruptcy court judges, decide the winners and losers. 
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The two most populous countries, China and India, are both opening up their aviation 
market gradually and selectively. They have tended to favor their major trading partners. 
As they gain more confidence in the international aviation market, and their economies 
continue to surge forward with strong growth, India and China is expected change their 
mindsets and shift towards a new aviation policy with emphasis on improved market 
access. 
 
The ASEAN skies with a significant market size of 500 millions people will start to be 
liberalized in 2006, with full liberalization expected in 2008, ahead of the development of 
a common ASEAN Economic Community in 2020. Pockets of liberalization have already 
begun in more mature economies like Thailand, Singapore and Brunei. Early indications 
show a trend towards lower fare and an increase in consumer surplus. Open skies in 
Australia and Singapore with the US could also drive the pace of liberalization of Asian 
airspace. A more progressive liberalized aviation environment will have a positive impact 
on low cost airlines based in Asia Pacific, allowing them to expand aggressively. 
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Keys Sectors Riding on LCC Growth 
Introduction 
Which sectors will benefit from the strong growth of low cost airlines? For this section, 
major industries both upstream and downstream of the food chain will be analyzed to 
determine major beneficiaries of the LCC phenomenon. To help in the analysis of the 
food chain and to provide a better focus on the resultant gains, this section is separate into 
2 distinct grouping, namely, Aircraft fleet and passenger (Appendix 27).  
 
Aircraft Fleet: Upstream Food Chain 
Among the key beneficiaries in the upstream of the aircraft fleet food chain are aircraft 
manufacturers, aircraft engine and component manufacturers, and providers of in-flight 
entertainment systems.  
 
I. Aircraft Manufacturers  
There are fierce competitions for the narrow body aircraft between Airbus’s A320 family 
and Boeing’s newer B737NG. Boeing has clear dominant position of this type of aircraft 
and has 63% market share, while Airbus has the remaining 37%, based on the number of 
aircraft that are in the Asia Pacific market (Exhibit 27). However, the market share will 
narrow to a ratio of 57% vs. 43% in 2009, with Airbus catching up real fast. Boeing’s 
B737 aircraft has been in the market since 1971 with the first model B737-200 delivered 
to Southwest Airlines in the United States. Airbus introduced the A320 aircraft in 1988 
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but the narrow-body aircraft gained popularity among low-cost airlines only in the early 
part of this decade. 
 
Exhibit 27 
B737 vs. A320 Market Share in Jun 2006 -2009   
B737 vs. A320 Market Share in 2009
737, 251, 57%
A320, 313, 43%
B737 vs. A320 Market Share in 2006 
A320, 236, 37%
737, 410, 63%
 
Source: ACAS, 2006 
 
The B737 has strong and loyal customers in the US and European markets due to its long 
track record of serving the LCCs since 1971. The key B737 customers include Southwest 
Airlines, Ryanair, easyJet and Virgin Blue, while A320 key customers are the newer 
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airlines such as JetBlue. Recently, AirAsia and JetStar have also converted their fleet to 
A320. A fascinating development is that easyJet and Air Berlin are operating both B737 
and A320 aircraft, but the two airlines will eventually lean towards the A320 aircraft due 
to the attractive aircraft pricing packages offered by Airbus.   
 
Narrow-body aircraft will dominate new orders for the aircraft manufacturers. In the 
recent Boeing market outlook projection, they expect the global market will absorb about 
16,000 aircraft in the next 20 years vs. Airbus conservative outlook of about 11,000 
aircraft (Exhibit 28).  
 
Exhibit 28 
Boeing vs. Airbus Projection for The Next 20 Years 
 
Source: Boeing 
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Based on orders placed by LCCs and network airlines in recent years, LCCs will 
significantly increase their market shares for aircraft in operation, especially in Asia 
Pacific. The Asia Pacific LCCs will have about 26% of the aircraft fleet in Asia Pacific 
by 2009 (Exhibit 29).  
 
Exhibit 29 
Projected LCC vs. Network Carriers Aircraft Fleet Market Share in 2009 
 
Source: ACAS 2006 
 
II. Aircraft Engine and Component Manufacturers  
CFM56 (CFM International), V2500 (IAE), JT8D (Pratt & Whitney) and BR700 (Rolls-
Royce) are the engines of choice for the current LCCs fleet. The older Pratt & Whitney 
JT8D engine is slowly disappearing from the market as the B737-200 is being replaced by 
more fuel efficient narrow body aircraft. BR700 future is bleak with Boeing deciding to 
discontinue production of the B717 aircraft in May 2006. V2500 are widely used for the 
A320 aircraft and the key company to benefit from this trend would be United 
Technologies, of which Pratt and Whitney is a division and in turn has shares in IAE. The 
Asia Pacific Aircraft Fleet Market Share in 2009E
LCC, 525, 26%
Network Carrier, 
1484, 74%
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CFM56 engine is also gaining widespread acceptance with A320 aircraft and being the 
sole engine source on B737-300 model onwards. CFM International is a joint venture by 
Snecma and General Electric.  
 
On the aircraft and engine lie many systems such as air management system, electrical 
power systems, hydraulic and flight control systems, engine accessories such fuel control 
and many more. The component manufacturer or system integrator provides these 
components and systems to the aircraft and engine manufacturers for integration into the 
final product. Original equipment manufacturers (OEM) include companies such as 
Hamilton Sundstrand, Honeywell, Goodrich, Rockwell Collins, and Smiths Aerospace to 
name a few. Hamilton Sundstrand, a United Technologies Corporation subsidiary and 
other OEMs will benefit greatly from the strong demand for A320 and B737NG aircraft. 
    
III. In-Flight Entertainment 
 
In-flight entertainment (IFE) is viewed as a potential ancillary revenue stream for 
advertising, pay-per-view, interactive gambling, duty free shopping and sale of food and 
beverage outlets. The products include overhead monitors or retractable LCDs, in-seat 
multi-channel video and DVD players. IFE is a standard product for full service carriers 
on long haul flights. However, it is a fairly new concept for LCCs, with JetBlue being the 
pioneer in introducing the free satellite television. This is primarily due to the carrier 
operating long haul flights in the US. Other LCCs like Kingfisher from India is also 
investing in IFE to differentiate their LCC brands in their respective geographic markets. 
As IFE is a relatively new concept for LCCs, it is too early to gauge if the LCCs will 
adopt expensive IFE system for short sector flights.  
 
 
 
- 82 - 
Aircraft Fleet: Downstream Food Chain 
In the downstream of the aircraft fleet food chain, the key beneficiaries would be 
companies specializing in aircraft and components maintenance, aircraft leasing, and 
airports. 
  
I. Aircraft and Component MRO 
The big increase in narrow-body aircraft orders for the next five years will lead to an 
increase in demand for aircraft maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) services for 
narrow-body aircraft, engines and aircraft components. The major MRO companies to 
benefit are likely to be those located where LCCs are expanding aggressively in the 
region, e.g., in the ASEAN, Australian and Indian markets. ST Aerospace currently 
provides MRO service contracts for Valuair (S$10-15 million), Air Asia (US$63 million) 
and JetStar (US$47 million), while Tiger Airways, an associate of SIA, utilizes the MRO 
services of SIA’s subsidiary, SIA Engineering (SIAEC). SIAEC also provides MRO 
services to other LCCs such as Cebu Pacific Air in the Philippines, and Go Air in India. 
ST Aerospace and SIAEC, is the leading MRO around the world and provides services to 
both full-service and low-cost airlines.  
 
ST Aerospace is actively pursuing the narrow-body aircraft market with the opening of a 
S$12 million new hangar in Seletar Airport (Singapore), which has been able to 
accommodate two narrow-body aircraft from March 2005. As more LCCs fly into Hong 
Kong and Macau and establish operating hubs in North Asia, HAECO (Hong Kong 
Aircraft Engineering Company) and GAMECO (Guangzhou Aircraft Maintenance 
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Company) are likely to see increased demand for their MRO services. At the same time, 
Boeing has also committed US$100 million to build a regional MRO facility in Nagpur, 
India to fulfill their pledge to Air India. Last year, Air India and its low cost subsidiary, 
Air India Express committed to Boeing to purchase 68 B737NG, B777 & B787 airplane, 
a record order of US$11.4 billion for Indian commercial transportation.      
 
Several OEM have also set up aerospace component repair facilities in the Asia Pacific 
region to cater to the growing demands for such services. In Singapore, the Loyang 
industrial park is renowned for its aerospace focus and has many companies including 
OEM setting up aviation related MRO services there. Singapore is currently Asia's largest 
and most comprehensive aerospace maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) hub with 
25% Asia market share. 
 
II. Aircraft Leasing Companies  
Among the leading aircraft leasing companies that have exposure in narrow-body aircraft 
are Boullioun Aviation Services, Singapore Aircraft Leasing Enterprise (SALE), Aviation 
Capital Group, Bavaria International Aircraft Leasing and Volvo Aviation. Most of the 
aircraft leasing companies serve both the full-service and low-cost airlines. Most of the 
Asia Pacific aircraft operated by the LCC were leased and about 75% were on operating 
leases in 2006 (Exhibit 30). More importantly, as highlighted in the Asia Pacific Fleet 
Analysis chapter, LCCs operate a significant number of aircraft on operating leases, 
particularly when operations are in initial start-up phases.  
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Exhibit 30 
Ownership of LCC aircraft in July 2006 
 
Source: ACAS 2006 
  
III. Regional Airports 
 
The regional airport will benefit from the LCC boom, with increased revenues from more 
aircraft landing and takeoff, as well as passenger departure taxes. Increased in passenger 
flow through the airport terminals will also boost sales in retail outlet. Airports are in 
essence a monopolistic play on the high traffic volume growth of the airline passenger 
industry without the burden of high and volatile oil prices. In Asia Pacific, Singapore and 
Malaysia airport authorities have finished building dedicated budget terminals within the 
main terminals. Depending on the success of Singapore and Malaysia, More airports in 
Asia will build such terminals in the next few years.  
The Singapore Budget Terminal opened on 26 Mar 2006, built at a cost of S$45 million 
and is designed to support low cost airline business model, which is different from that of 
the traditional full service airlines. It comprises of 2 adjacent single-storey buildings for 
departure and arrival respectively, covering about 25,000 sqm. It has the lowest 
international charge of S$7 for airport tax and security surcharge is $6. It is able to handle 
Ownership of LCC Aircraft in July
Leased, 271, 75%
Owned, 88, 25% 
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about 2.7 million passengers per year initially with a total of 10 departure gates, 18 check 
in counters, and 3 arrival baggage belts (Exhibit 31).  
 
Exhibit 31: Singapore Budget Terminal 
 
Source: Singapore Changi Airport  
 
Smaller secondary airports like Senai (next to Singapore’s Changi airport), Subang (close 
to KLIA), Don Muang (the existing international airport in Bangkok, to be replaced by 
Suvarnabhumi Airport) and Macau (close to Hong Kong International Airport) could be 
developed as low-cost airport hubs if the respective governments can be convinced of the 
potential in keeping the secondary airports fully utilized. 
 
Passenger Flow Food Chain 
As low cost airlines take off in Asia, there will be several potential opportunities in the 
marketplace with increase flow in human traffic. As mentioned earlier, airports are key 
beneficiaries as the increased passenger flow implies higher incomes from passenger 
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airport tax, as well as higher commercial revenues from renting out space for airport duty-
free shops and restaurants. The other sectors that could benefit from a greater human 
traffic flow are hotels, car rental companies, internet travel websites and the property 
market.  
 
I. On-Line Travel Agencies  
Independent on-line travel agencies such as Flight Center (FCL), the leading travel 
retailer in Australia would benefit. On-line travel agencies provide the following benefits 
to various stakeholders:   
• Professional approach - a shift from contracting to supplier relationship management  
• Creation of value propositions for a one-stop virtual travel shop.  
• Introduction of competitive tendering  
• Active channeling   
While independent on-line travel agencies will compete with LCCs for secondary 
revenues, the experience in the Australian travel market indicates that Flight Center has 
seen continual record profits and has expanded to more than 1,100 retail shops and 
corporate travel offices in eight countries, despite competition from the internal websites 
of Virgin Blue, JetStar and Qantas in Australia.  
 
II. Hotel and Car Rental Companies 
Low-cost airline prefer direct transaction with their customer through their own websites. 
This is to eliminate commissions and to gain additional commission revenue when the 
consumer makes reservation for hotel rooms and car through the airline website. Budget 
hotels, and, to a lesser degree, budget car rentals, could also benefit from a sharp increase 
in their respective operations. Leisure and budget-conscious travelers need affordable 
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accommodations and transportation, and franchise operators of budget hotels in Asia 
Pacific should see increased operations due to greater demand for discretionary travel.  
 
III. Property Market  
Another quarter to ride on the LCC boom is the property market around the regions. With 
more convenient air services to remote regions would rekindle investment in 
infrastructure such as road and vacation homes. This could drive up property values in the 
regional market. LCCs are currently focusing in Thailand (Phuket, Bangkok and Chiang 
Mai), Indonesia (Padang and Bali), East Malaysia (Kota Kinabalu and Kuching), 
Australia (Perth) and Macau. As the travel market matures for these resort destinations, 
property prices around these areas could appreciate if vacation homes start to spring up in 
these markets.  
  
Conclusion 
From the above food chain analysis, the key industries that would benefit from Asia 
Pacific low cost airlines growth are the aircraft manufacturers (e.g., Boeing and Airbus), 
aircraft engine manufacturers (e.g., International Aero Engines, Snecma and General 
Electric), original equipment manufacturers (e.g. Hamilton Sundstrand, Honeywell, 
Goodrich, Smiths, Rockwell Collins etc), in-flight entertainment service providers (e.g. 
Panasonic and Thales) and aircraft maintenance providers (e.g., SIAEC and ST 
Engineering). Airports (e.g., Singapore Changi Airport and Airports of Thailand) should 
also gain form the resultant increase in passenger traffic volume.  
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There will also be accompanying growth in non-aviation sectors. Other industries that 
could benefit are aircraft leasing companies, budget hotels and car rentals, on-line 
reservation travel agencies, and property developers. Increase air services will promote 
trade and tourism, and will link more people around the Asia Pacific region and drives 
growth and development, while improving the social welfare of the population. 
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Hamilton Sundstrand Aftermarket Services  
Introduction 
This chapter aims to identify the market opportunities that Hamilton Sundstrand can 
target for with the low cost carrier emerging in the Asia Pacific airline industry. Therefore 
a clear understanding of the external environment is crucial. The ultimate aim is to 
develop a match between the organisation's capabilities and the environment in which the 
organisation operates. However, the dynamic nature of the environment is one of the 
main sources of uncertainty. First, we will provide an overview of Hamilton Sundstrand 
Aerospace Division range of products and services. Then follow on with an analysis of 
the MRO industry using the modified Porter’s five forces. We will also utilize the SWOT 
analysis to understand the company strength, weakness and what opportunities and threat 
lies ahead of Hamilton Sundstrand. Finally, we will recommend strategies that the 
company can adopt to remain competitive and continue to win market shares and be a 
success story in the MRO industry. 
 
Overview of Hamilton Sundstrand  
Hamilton Sundstrand's Aerospace is based in Windsor Locks, Connecticut, USA. 
Hamilton Sundstrand is The Aerospace Power Company, recognized worldwide as a pre-
eminent value-added systems supplier to the aerospace industry. They specialize in 
electric, hydraulic, pneumatic and mechanical power - and the conversion of power from 
one form to another, its management and distribution. The following diagram illustrates 
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the various systems that Hamilton Sundstrand supplied to various aircraft manufacturers 
such as Boeing, Airbus and Embraer etc (Diagram 3).  
 
Diagram 3: The Aerospace Power Company 
 
Source: Hamilton Sundstrand 
 
The Aerospace segment consists of business areas comprising of specialized product-and 
customer-aligned enterprises. These four business units are described below. 
 
Flight & Undersea Systems 
Flight Systems unit, provides integrated system solutions for aircraft applications, 
including propellers, flight control actuation (Diagram 4), emergency power and 
electromagnetic systems. Space and Undersea Systems, provides high performance 
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integrated system solutions at any altitude from Oceans to Orbit. These systems are used 
in marine, land, missile, expendable and reusable launch vehicles, and human space 
exploration as well as unmanned satellites and spacecraft. These systems include 
propellant management and storage, turbine power systems, power generation, control, 
management and distribution, actuation, motors and motor drives, thermal management, 
environmental control and life support, remote sensing and instruments, and engineering 
and operational support services. 
 
Diagram 4: Flight Control Systems 
 
Source: Hamilton Sundstrand 
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Electric Systems 
Electric Systems, provides electric power generation, distribution and management 
systems on aircraft. Products include integrated drive generators, constant speed drives, 
auxiliary generators and electric power conversion equipment, controllers and power 
management devices. Integrated electric system architecture typically includes primary 
Power Distribution Assemblies (PDAs) and Secondary Power Distribution Assemblies 
(SPDAs). Components such as Generator Control Units, Transformer Rectifier Units, 
contactors, circuit breakers, primary power distribution relays and circuit protection are 
integrated as modular assemblies within the PDAs (Diagram 5). 
 
Diagram 5: An Integrated Electric System 
 
Source: Hamilton Sundstrand 
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Engine Systems 
Engine Systems, provides engine controls, starters, gearboxes, fuel pumps, lubrication 
systems and scavenge pumps to various aircraft engine manufacturer such as Pratt 
Whitney, Rolls Royce, General Electric, International Aero Engine (Diagram 6). 
Hamilton Sundstrand unique capability to design and integrate subsystems results in 
significant engine systems benefits. These benefits include reduced cost and optimized 
system performance, weight and packaging. 
 
Diagram 6: Engine System Products 
 
Source: Hamilton Sundstrand 
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Air Management & Power Systems 
Air Management, provides air management systems and fans. Air Management Systems 
include air conditioning systems, heat exchangers, pneumatic valves, cabin pressure 
controls, wing and cowl anti-ice equipment, high pressure and low pressure ducting, 
sensors, controllers and cockpit humidification. Power Systems, designs and 
manufactures a variety of products for commercial and military aircraft. Products include 
airborne auxiliary power units, electric fans, gas turbine engines for small propulsion 
systems and vapor cycle cooling systems. 
 
Customer Service 
The broad cope of components and systems across various commercial aircraft and 
engine platforms as describe above enable HS to take advantage of any upswing in 
aircraft orders as well as present a challenge to provide effective after market support. 
This task is given to the customer service organization, which is responsible for ensuring 
customer satisfaction as well as running MRO operations to expand HS after market sales 
and services. We will focus in the next section on the MRO industry to understand what 
opportunities that HS can reap from the LCC growth.  
 
Porter Five Forces of Analysis on MRO Industry 
In the assessment of the attractiveness of MRO Market in Asia Pacific, we will utilize a 
modified Porter’s five forces of analysis (Lewis et al., 1999) to understand the key 
industry trend as illustrated in exhibit 32. Lewis et al. (1999) found that adjustments need 
to be made on Porter five forces analytical framework in order to extract maximum value 
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out of it. Michael Porter identified five forces that determine the intrinsic long-run profit 
attractiveness of a market or a market segment. The five factors are: 
1. Competitive rivalry within the industry 
2. Threat of substitutes 
3. Threat of new entrant 
4. Buyer power 
5. Supplier power 
 
The five forces analysis depicts the industry at the current time. However, it is also 
important to understand just what the key industry developments that have shape the 
industry current position, in order to figure out whether if the trend will continue.  
 
Exhibit 32: Modified Porter Five Forces Analysis of MRO Industry 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In today’s increasing competitive aviation environment as a result of air service 
liberalization and continued steady rise in oil prices over the past three years due to fear 
of possible supply disruptions, airlines including LCCs are very focus on reducing their 
overall cost. Airlines will spend around US$38.8 billion on MRO activities this year, 
according to a survey by consultants BACK Aviation Solutions and Strand Associates Inc 
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(SAI) for McGraw-Hill earlier in the year (ARSA, 2006). Heavy maintenance visits and 
major modifications or retrofits will account for US$12.2 billion; engine overhauls 
US$10.6 billion, line maintenance US$8.8 billion and the component market US$7.2 
billion. AeroStrategy estimates that commercial jet aircraft with more than 35 seats will 
generate MRO demand worth more than $38 billion this year. This is spread across five 
primary market segments: off-wing engine overhaul; airframe heavy checks (C and D 
checks); component overhaul and repair; line maintenance (including A, B and overnight 
checks); and major airframe modifications, including cargo conversions, avionic upgrades 
and IFE modifications. Jane's estimates, which cover different parameters from the SAI 
survey, suggest just over US$16 billion for maintenance on aircraft with more than 100 
seats. Overall, the MRO business is estimated by various experts to be worth $36-$41 
billion (Moorman, 2006). As shown in exhibit 33, AeroStrategy calculates that MRO 
demand will reach $55 billion in 2015, implying an annual growth rate of 3.6 per cent.  
 
Exhibit 33: 2005-2015 MRO Market Forecast ($bn) 
 
Source: AeroStrategy 
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Competitors in the MRO aftermarket include full service nose-to-tail MRO provider from 
the airlines’ maintenance subsidiaries, Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) own 
repair facilities and third parties independent MRO or component repair facilities. 
Outsourcing of MRO work, which was an initiative of the low cost carriers to benefit 
from economies of scales, is to the extent of around 51% at present. This is one among 
many trends shaping the sustainability of the MRO market. For the foreseeable future, 
network and low cost airlines will both demand lower cost but high quality MRO 
services, as well as faster turnaround time.  
 
Aviation MRO Industry Trend 
Outsourcing Trend for MRO Services 
Maintenance is traditionally one of the main barriers to entry for any new carrier. Setting 
up an in-house maintenance department requires a high level of capital investment in 
facilities and components that a low cost new carrier simply can’t afford if it is to be 
competitive. Start-ups and low cost carriers pursuing a high growth strategy are typically 
short on capital and driven by variable costs. Low cost Airlines only alternative is to 
outsource as much of the maintenance function as practical. Outsourcing to an 
organization with the in-depth MRO knowledge minimizes LCCs’ need for capital 
investment and allows them to benefit from economies of scale realized by a large, high 
volume MRO service provider. In a recent article publish in Aviation Week, Lott (2006) 
reported that US low cost carriers have outsourced 51% of their maintenance spending, 
while traditional network airlines have increase their maintenance outsourcing to 41% 
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from 25% in 2000. This trend towards outsourcing will create considerable opportunities 
in the MRO Market.  
 
Airline Affiliated MRO Turn into A Profit Center 
The current uncertainties and financial turmoil within the airline industry provided a 
catalyst for radical changes in airline maintenance, repair and overhaul operations. 
Traditional network carriers seek to turn cost centers to profit centers, reduce variable 
costs and transfer inventory costs to original equipment manufacturers (OEMs). 
Conventionally, the legacy network carrier maintenance model operated with about 75% 
in-house maintenance capabilities and overhauls virtually everything from airframe to 
oven. This requires a large infrastructure and resulted in a high burden cost. Despite the 
shift towards more reliance on third parties MRO service providers, the burden remains. 
To reduce this burden, Airline MRO shop is actively seeking third party works to 
augment the base load from the airline that own them. At the same time, they are 
refocusing on specialty repairs instead overhauling everything and relying on continuous 
improvement program to become leaner and more competitive.  
 
Early Retirement of Older Aircraft 
Since September 11th event in US, older aircraft have been retired from fleets more 
quickly than originally planned. This prompted airlines to turn increasingly to OEM 
suppliers for their long term business, as the cost of retooling for new aircraft types 
becomes prohibitively expensive and the OEMs themselves seek more long term support 
contracts. Some of the network airlines have even seek to dispose of their engineering 
services division to reduce current operational expenditure or turn cost centers to profit 
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centers. This has meant more business for independent and OEM MRO suppliers, but at 
lower margins. For example, Southwest and GE Engine Services signed an eight-year, 
$1.5 billion OnPoint Solutions service agreement covering the carrier's nearly 600 
CFM56-7Bs. In June 2005, it is reported by Moorman (2006) that JetBlue signed a 10-
year contract with MTU Aero Engines, a member of the IAE consortium, to provide 
exclusive maintenance services for the airline's IAE V2500 engines. The contract covers 
as many as 360 engines on the airline's fleet of A320s. Both Southwest and JetBlue 
expect the deals to help in overall maintenance cost reduction. 
 
Growth of Package MRO Service Program 
Independent MRO service providers have also began to respond to the market forces, by 
marketing new, more flexible MRO packages for the airlines. Airlines that lack a pre-
existing maintenance infrastructure or are reluctant to expand in-house maintenance 
resources are turning to independent MRO service provider to solve both the operational 
and financial challenges of maintenance. In Europe, LCC such as easyJet has utilized 
independent MRO provider, FLS Aerospace to be the prime maintenance organization. In 
Asia Pacific, as mentioned in earlier chapter on Food Chain Analysis, ST Aerospace 
currently provides MRO service contracts for LCC such as Air Asia and JetStar, while 
Cebu Pacific, Tiger Airways and Go Air contracted their MRO services to SIA 
Engineering Company. Many LCCs have outsourced aircraft maintenance to free up 
airline management to concentrate exclusively on earning revenue. However, this growth 
in OEM and independent MRO support services will inevitably cause tensions in the 
market as OEMs & Independent MRO find themselves competing for third party business 
against the maintenance divisions of their own customers. Rather than compete, OEMs 
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and their customer airlines could also be drawn closer together; KLM has set up a 
partnership with General Electric that could save the airline up to US$35 million in lower 
inventory costs alone and in July this year, Revima APU, a Hamilton Sundstrand joint 
venture has also signed an exclusive agreement with Lufthansa Technik for the 
maintenance of Auxiliary Power Units (APUs). Under this agreement, Revima APU will 
perform repair services on all APUs installed on Lufthansa Technik’s customers’ MD11 
airplanes. This created long term strategic partnership and win-win solution for both 
parties and their customers. 
 
Evolving B2B Aviation e-Marketplace 
In recent years, IT providers have become far more aggressive at getting business by 
unveiling flexible solutions to help plan, manage and track maintenance as well as to keep 
up with the latest regulatory changes. IT has become the necessary link between airlines 
and their designated MRO organizations, whether in-house or outsourced. Not only are 
airlines interested in MROs with IT systems that can track day-to-day maintenance, but 
carriers also want to make sure that MROs' IT systems are capable of integrating with 
theirs. Taking the lead, 13 airlines created a neutral aviation e-marketplace called the 
Aeroxchange, to maximize efficiency across the complex aviation supply chain by 
exploiting the power of the internet. Aeroxchange improve visibility to all source of 
supply and resulted in better pricing for the airlines (Exhibit 34). Additional saving are 
possible through the elimination of cumbersome integration of supplier and buyer IT 
systems and online procurement. The potential benefits of more efficient buying and 
selling of parts, information and services are clear. What is uncertain though is how 
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quickly the largest international airlines are going to adopt new purchasing strategies to 
take advantage of the Internet. 
 
Exhibit 34 Aeroxchange Suite of e-Services 
 
Source: Aeroxchange 
 
Growth of Non-OEM PMA Parts 
Another approach the airlines have taken to reduce maintenance cost and limit OEM 
pricing power is the sourcing of Parts Manufacturer Approval (PMA) parts and 
Designated Engineering Representatives (DER)-approved repairs. PMA is a combined 
design and production approval for modification and replacement parts. It allows a 
manufacturer to produce and sell these parts for installation on type certificated products. 
PMA parts are generally categorized as replacement aircraft parts made by someone other 
than the original equipment manufacturer. OEMs are usually the original type and 
production certificate holders for aircraft, engines, accessories, and individual parts. 
DER-approved repairs are repairs that go through a rigorous approval process overseen 
by the FAA, a process that results in a repair that is equal or better than the OEM part, at 
a price significantly lower than the original. The FAA is the regulatory body for all 
aircraft parts. Typically, PMA parts are between 25 to 30 percent cheaper than OEM 
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parts. AeroStrategy estimated that PMA sales to the airline market generated about $330 
million in 2005. By 2010, AeroStrategy expects that figure to be between $800 million 
and $1 billion, driven mainly by huge gains in the engine PMA arena (ARSA, 2006). 
OEMs will still control the vast majority of parts demand by 2010 even under optimistic 
projections (Exhibit 35). However, PMA penetration for some OEMs will be much higher 
than the market average, especially for high replacement mechanical parts. 
 
Exhibit 35: Total Available PMA Parts Markets 
 
Source: AeroStrategy 
 
Key Governmental Industry Influences 
In Asia Pacific, investment in MRO facilities is welcome by most countries’ government 
policies. With China's entry to the World Trade Organization (WTO), the aircraft MRO is 
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the main service sector that will be opened widest to foreign companies. Foreign firms are 
allowed to establish companies in China, either in the form of joint venture or 
independent companies, to operate MRO business for Chinese or international air 
carriers. Singapore is also promoting itself as the aviation hub and many OEMs are 
attracted to start operation in Singapore due to its favorable business environment, high 
pool of skilled professional and good infrastructure.  
 
MRO activities are regulated by major civil aviation authorities such as Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA), European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), and the local civil 
aviation authority where the facility is situated. In order to start operation, the MRO 
organization has to be certified by the local civil aviation authority and major civil 
authorities such as FAA or EASA as a minimum. Rarely does the FAA/EASA revoke any 
MRO organization license but the license is only renewable after an audit of the facility 
operation on a frequency as determine by the relevant civil aviation authority. The norm 
is at least once a year. 
 
Threat of New Entrants 
The barrier of entry and the profit of the industry determine the key of whether a potential 
entrant will come into an industry. If the barrier is high or the profit after the entrance is 
small, then the possibility of the potential entrant’s entry is low, and the challenges for the 
existing market players within the industry is insignificant. The aviation MRO is an 
industry of high entry barrier and lucrative profit and very few private individual 
entrepreneurs would consider starting a MRO venture unless they have technical know- 
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how and huge capital support. The potential entrants of Asia Pacific MRO service include 
third party foreign MRO companies and the MRO facilities set up by OEM. Both of them 
having the technical knowledge, capital and management, and they will have a big impact 
on Airline owned MRO facilities in the Asia Pacific region. OEM has proprietary 
technical information of their products and has the practice of limiting the access only to 
airlines or the aircraft manufacturer only. This has restricted the number of companies 
that can enter into the MRO market.  
 
As reported by Jackman (2001), most major OEMs are pursuing the partnership strategy. 
This strategy is driven by the airlines that are demanding better equipment reliability, 
more predictable costs and service programs geared towards more operational support 
than simply overhaul and maintenance. Airlines want to do business with smaller number 
of vendors and are ever more on the lookout for one-stop shopping. To deliver this type 
of support package requires a broad capabilities and worldwide locations that are 
complicated for any single company to possess and still be flexible enough to develop 
customized support solutions for different airlines. This type of service often is 
deliverable only through partnerships and joint ventures. Multi-company networks 
involving companies from a variety of market segments can develop a complete support 
packages for their customers that include engineering services, technical data and 
manuals, inventory management and logistics, and major modifications and retrofits, as 
well as airframe and component repair services. In pursuit of this trend, Airbus is taking 
steps to create a worldwide MRO network to strengthen its direct ties with third party 
providers. The Airbus MRO network has 13 members worldwide and has Hong Kong 
Aircraft Engineering Company (HAECO), SIA Engineering Company and ST Aerospace 
in Asia Pacific (Airbus Press Center, 2006). Major engines OEMs such as GE, Rolls-
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Royce and Pratt & Whitney also have joint venture overhaul facilities around the world to 
support their engines and those of their competitors. Honeywell and Hamilton 
Sundstrand, both major suppliers of aircraft systems and components is also aggressive 
aftermarket player. Hamilton Sundstrand has 2 repair facilities in Asia Pacific that are 
joint ventures with the airlines to support their products and those of their competitors. 
 
Bargaining Power of Buyers 
Airlines are facing fierce competition and falling yields as mentioned in the introduction 
of Low Cost Carrier Business Models section, and are embracing MRO service programs 
that have the features of predictable maintenance costs and cater towards operational 
support. They want to deal with fewer vendors and are increasingly seeking for one-stop 
MRO service providers. The growing sophistication and reliability of present aircraft 
plays a pivotal role here. Latest planes design entail less maintenance, which set hurdles 
for a carrier to achieve the critical mass of maintenance work needed to justify the capital 
outlay of doing it in-house. But at the same time, the more and more sophisticated 
hardware found on newer aircraft requires increasingly complex and expensive test 
equipment, couple with the greater system reliability of new components means there are 
fewer test requirements. This make it even harder to justify the operating cost of a new 
test rig, and training technician to operate it, if it's going to be used less often than older 
test rigs. Outsourcing becomes a viable alternative and there is increasing trend of 
outsourcing as mentioned in the Aviation MRO Industry Trend section. 
 
Repair and overhaul (MRO) market is dominated by the accelerating development of 
comprehensive and complicated global aftermarket service networks comprising of 
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airlines, original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) and third-party independent repair 
facilities. In Asia Pacific, the OEM is dominating the market through either their joint 
ventures with the airlines or partnership with third party service providers in the region. 
Foreign MRO outside the Asia Pacific region such as Lufthansa Technik (LHT), the 
MRO arm of Lufthansa German Airlines and other airline affiliated MRO operations, 
such as SR Technics, United Services and Delta, are at least in part banking on their 
operational experience to attract customers in Asia. Together with in-region airline 
affiliated MRO such as HAECO and SIA Engineering Company, and third party MRO 
such as ST Aerospace, the increasing competition has create a bargaining power for the 
airline operators.    
 
Bargaining Power of Suppliers 
Traditionally, OEM exerts considerable power in the MRO supply chains. This can be 
observed from the ability of the OEM to continuously escalate their catalogue part prices. 
When third parties MRO procured parts to repair OEM aircraft components, they are 
always subjected to the full catalogue lead time and this lead to great inefficiency in the 
supply chains. However, regulations start to change in 1996, with FAA changing the 
format of its airworthiness bilateral with foreign civil aviation authorities to one that was 
more flexible and addressed Parts Manufacturer Approval (PMA) parts specifically 
(Broderick, 2005). Then, in 1997, Lufthansa Technik helped put PMA on the radar screen 
in Europe by investing in Heico subsidiary Heico Aerospace. Heico is a key PMA parts 
manufacturer and supplier, and Lufthansa Technik (LHT) is the MRO arm of Lufthansa 
Airlines (Exhibit 36).  
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Exhibit 36 Lufthansa Airline Integration Strategy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LHT has more than 20 subsidiaries, affiliates and joint ventures doing everything from 
heavy maintenance to manufacturing PMA parts. The vertical integration strategies 
(Exhibit 36) adopted by Lufthansa Airline have a significant impact on the OEM pricing 
power. Additionally, this backward integration permit Lufthansa Airline to improve 
supply chain coordination, capture upstream profit margin, gain access to downstream 
manufacturing channels that otherwise would be inaccessible and gain in core 
competencies. However, this competitive advantage cannot be easily duplicated by Low 
cost carriers. 
 
Threat of Substitutes 
As detailed in the section on growth of non-OEM PMA parts, even a doubling of PMA 
sales will still limit PMA encroachment to about 5-6% by 2010 with MRO parts demand 
estimated to be around US$1 billion (Exhibit 35). OEMs will still control the vast 
majority of parts demand by 2010 even under optimistic projections. There are several 
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developments in Asia Pacific low cost carrier (LCC) fleet that are working against PMA 
penetration that will mirror the trend in Europe (Broderick 2005). Leasing is more 
common among LCC. In the chapter on Asia Pacific Airlines Fleet Analysis, the section 
on aircraft lessors riding on LCC boom found that about 75% of the LCC aircraft are on 
operating lease. Coupled with lessors' general negative attitude toward PMA parts usage, 
this would mean that there will be fewer PMA sales to LCCs. As Broderick (2005) 
reported, PMAs are accepted at the governmental level, but not necessarily at the 
procurement level. The biggest hurdle lies at the cultural level, which is in the attitudes of 
potential customers. 
 
Asia Pacific MRO Industry Rivalry 
Worldwide MRO business is estimated by various experts to be worth $36-$41 billion 
(Moorman, 2006). As shown in exhibit 37, AeroStrategy calculates that MRO demand 
will reach $55 billion in 2015, implying an annual growth rate of 3.6 per cent. However, 
AeroStrategy estimated that Asia Pacific will have a robust growth of 5.1% as compared 
to North America 2.6% and Europe 2.7% slower growth projection (Exhibit 37).  
 
Exhibit 37 
 
Source: AeroStrategy 
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As Lewis et al (1999) suggested, a fast growing industry will have a relatively lower 
industry rivalry because there is room for most or all organizations to prosper. However, 
the slower growth rate in North America & Europe will push more experienced foreign 
MROs to seek the greener pasture in Asia Pacific. As noted in earlier section, LHT has a 
comprehensive global MRO network and is more likely to set their eyes on Asia to 
continue their market expansion for MRO services and PMA parts. Currently, the Asia 
Pacific LCCs MRO market has been shared between SIA Engineering Company and ST 
Aerospace. With more foreign MROs competing with the regional MRO organizations 
for the same slice of the market. The decreased concentration of market players will 
further increase the industry rivalry within the Asia Pacific region, a point raised by 
Lewis et al (2006).   
 
Lewis et al (1999) suggested that industry rivalry will also increase if the switching cost 
is low, which will be easy for buyers to switch from one competitor’s product to another. 
This would be more applicable to the LCCs whose maintenance is mainly outsourced as 
discussed in earlier section on Outsourcing Trend for MRO Services. LCCs continuous 
drive towards a lower cost base will weaken their loyalty to any MRO service provider. 
Therefore it is important for MRO to increase the exit barrier in their service package or 
entice the LCCs to commit to a long term service agreements.  
 
Having reviewed the MRO industry dynamics using the modified Porter’s five forces, we 
will continue with a SWOT analysis to review Hamilton Sundstrand resources to meet the 
competition in the next section. 
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SWOT Analysis on Hamilton Sundstrand 
In this section, we will shift the focus from the firm’s industry environment as examine 
above using the modified Porter’s five forces framework to the characteristics of the firm 
itself. The following section will scrutinize Hamilton Sundstrand’s potential for 
establishing competitive advantage by assessing Hamilton Sundstrand resources and 
capabilities, which the organization owns or has access to. The case for making the 
resources and capabilities of the firm the foundation for its long-term strategy rests upon 
two premises. The first concerns the role of resources in defining the identity of the firm. 
That is determining what the firm can do and deciding in which industries and through 
what types of competitive strategy the firm can best exploit these capabilities. The second 
reason for focusing on resources as the foundation for a firm’s strategy is that profits are 
ultimately a return to the resources owned and controlled by the firm (Grant, 1998). The 
Resource-Based View (RBV) highlights the need for a fit between the external market 
context in which a firm operates and its internal capabilities. Let’s start by examining 
Hamilton Sundstrand strength and weakness. 
 
Strength  
To examine how the company can create competitive advantage, the framework proposed 
by Grant (2002) as shown in exhibit 38 will be used to evaluate how groups of resources 
work together to create the capabilities that led to the firm competitive advantage. 
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Exhibit 38: The Two Levels of Resource Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Grant, 2002 
 
Tangible Physical Assets 
HS maintains a global presence to meet the needs of commercial airline customers 
worldwide. Their customer support managers provide customers a single point of contact 
for all their support needs. HS has benefited from its worldwide aviation aftermarket 
network (Exhibit 39). In Asia Pacific it has four MRO facilities (appendix 10) to support 
its aviation product and other OEM product. The proximity to the customers 
differentiated HS from its competitors and permits a quick turnaround of customers’ 
assets. In Singapore, it also tied up with logistic provider United Parcel Services to 
manage the parts distribution to Asia Pacific customers. This ensures a timely delivery of 
components to support customer critical operational requirements. HS leverage on it 
global presence with local focus and support to gain a competitive advantage.   
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Exhibit 39: Hamilton Sundstrand Worldwide MRO Facilities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Hamilton Sundstrand 
 
HS also seek operational excellence through their manufacturing operations global 
presence (Exhibit 40). HS aims to perform in the most efficient and cost-effective way 
possible in all areas throughout their entire end-to-end value chain, from suppliers to 
internal activities to their customers.  
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Exhibit 40: Hamilton Sundstrand Worldwide Manufacturing 
Facilities 
 
Source: Hamilton Sundstrand 
 
Tangible Financial Assets 
Hamilton Sundstrand (HS) has recorded impressive financial performance in recent years, 
which reflects in its top line and profitability. As of 2005, HS employs 16,239 people 
worldwide and records US$4.4 billion revenue with an operating profit of US$675 
million on US$8.9 billion of assets (UTC 2005 annual report). HS achieves this with well 
established disciplines built on lean manufacturing principles including an integrated 
supply chain. HS revenue rose 11.8% and operating profit increased $92 million (16%) as 
compared with 2004 due to the impact of acquisition. UTC financial strength has allowed 
HS to pursue organic growth through acquisition. The commercial aircraft Systems is 
drawing in US$2 billion revenue with commercial aftermarket constitutes about US$850 
million of total revenue in 2005 and has grown 6%, a result reflecting higher aerospace 
aftermarket volumes (Exhibit 41).  
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Exhibit 41: Breakdown of Total Revenue by Segment 
   
Source: Hamilton Sundstrand Company Data 
 
Intangible Assets: Human Resource 
As mentioned in the earlier Hamilton Sundstrand Overview, Hamilton Sundstrand is one 
of the world largest system integrator and supplier. Their engineering innovation is a 
result of rigorous research and engineering program management and investment in their 
people. United Technologies (UTC) employees, of which Hamilton Sundstrand is a 
division, have earned 18,500 college and university degrees under the company’s 
recognized and applauded Employee Scholar Program. UTC pays all tuition and costs, 
provide paid time away from work, and award UTC common stock on degree attainment. 
This allowed the company to retain talent and always have the best educated people 
within the company.  
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Intangible Assets: Technology 
HS vision is to become the lowest cost, highest quality manufacturer of proprietary, 
highly engineered products and systems. HS strength lies in its innovative engineering 
capabilities. Since HS predecessor companies were founded, the company has generated 
more than 3,000 U.S. patents. A380 airliner and, most recently, the Boeing B787 will 
increase the patents the company holds. Based on the B787 inventions identified so far, 
HS could end up filing more than 100 additional patent applications just for the B787 
program alone. Base on HS capabilities to integrate complex aircraft systems, Boeing has 
tapped HS to supply seven major systems for the Boeing B787. The value of these wins 
over the life of the program will exceed $6 billion. HS and its international team of 
business enterprises are also leading suppliers for the Airbus A380 now in development. 
It will provide systems that break conventional norms for power, size and efficiency, 
including the aircraft Air Generation System, Cabin Pressure and Control System, 
Emergency Power System and Trimmable Horizontal Stabilizer Actuator. 
 
Intangible Assets: Reputation 
HS engineering expertise and capabilities in integrating their whole supply chain to bring 
added value to their customers have been recognized by major customers. Boeing named 
HS Supplier of the Year in 1999 for outstanding performance in providing the integrated 
electrical power system for the 717. AVIC I Commercial Aircraft Co. (ACAC) Limited of 
Shanghai China, has awarded HS the ARJ21 Supplier of the Year Award in 2004. ACAC 
is the aircraft manufacturer for the regional jet ARJ21. The US Defense Supply Center 
has recognized HS as a Platinum Supplier, its top award for suppliers. The center is the 
Department of Defense’s lead center for procurement of aviation-related spare parts and 
HS’s largest single military aftermarket customer. Additionally, the growing engineering 
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expertise in aircrafts system integration has allow HS to get into more and more contents 
on major aircraft programs as shown in Exhibit 42. 
 
Exhibit 42: Hamilton Sundstrand Aircraft Content Index 
 
Source: Hamilton Sundstrand  
 
Customer service is another area where the company has excels in. Customer Service is a 
major source of revenue (42% of total revenue as shown in exhibit 41) for the company 
and is HS main point of contact with airline customers. The Customer Service 
organization is structured along regional lines to allow it to better focus its efforts on 
customers in a specific area of the world. It is a far-flung enterprise with about 1,500 
employees serving about 900 customers worldwide. It has three regional organizations 
covering the Americas; Europe, the Middle East and Africa; and the Asia Pacific region. 
The organization has developed innovative support packages that provide value to 
customers by taking on some of their tasks. The CARE (Comprehensive Accessory 
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Repair and Exchange) aftermarket service performs both asset and repair management for 
customers. HS also has structured several onsite support agreements at major airlines that 
provide technical support and inventory management. 
 
Organizational Capabilities or Core Competence 
A core competence is a potential foundation for any new or revised strategy. The term 
core competency refers to a company’s expertise or skills in key areas that directly 
produces superior performance. As the analysis of HS resources shows, HS aims to 
become the highest quality, lowest cost, most customer focused provider of highly 
engineered products and integrated systems for aerospace customers. To achieve this 
goal, HS employ three business strategies. 
 
1. Build on HS success in engineering and servicing integrated systems by offering 
value-added solutions to customers, flawlessly execute existing program and 
improve competitive position and global presence. 
2. Establish operational excellence in all areas by reducing costs, improve efficiency 
and quality. Focus on continuous improvement and deliver exceptional financial 
performance 
3. Continue to develop an empowered, energized workforce by valuing employee, 
emphasize career development, improved skills and communicate honestly and 
often 
The execution of these business strategies can be established from the analysis of HS 
using the Porter’s value chain as illustrate in Exhibit 43 
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Exhibit 43: Hamilton Sundstrand Value Chain 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Inbound Logistics 
HS global manufacturing presence allows it to capitalize on manufacturing core products 
in the lowest cost plant within HS. Additionally, in-house manufacturing capabilities 
facilitates new product development as the interaction of design and manufacturing 
engineers ensure the parts are easier to manufacture. The ease of manufacturing will 
reduce cycle time and reduce cost of producing the parts and result in lower cost parts. 
 
Operations 
HS run a solid MRO operation and this is demonstrated by their exceptional operational 
performance. HS integrated supply chain management address increasing customer 
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demands for quality, delivery, and speed. Supply chains can exist in both manufacturing 
and service organizations, and they are principally concerned with the flow of products 
and information between supply chain member organizations. This includes activities 
such as procurement of materials, transformation of materials into finished product, and 
distribution of that product to end customers. Today’s information-driven, integrated 
supply chains are enabling HS to reduce inventory and costs, add product value, extend 
resources, accelerate time to market, and retain customers.  
 
“Outbound Logistics” 
The average turnaround time for component repair is within the industry best of 15 days. 
The global manufacturing operations and MRO presence allows it to be close to the 
customers and permits a quick turnaround of customers’ assets. The facilities proximity 
offer great inventory saving to the airlines. The longer it takes to return a serviceable 
component to the airline after repair would means provisioning a higher level of 
inventory for airline operation. A typical industry inventory provisioning calculation 
found that a 30 days vs. a 15 days turnaround time would generate saving of 47%. A 45 
days vs. a 15 days turnaround time would save the airline a hefty 91% on inventory. 
 
Marketing & Sales  
HS has a strong marketing team and has been recognized within the aviation industry to 
be innovative in their approach to design MRO packages to meet the customer demands. 
Exhibit 44 highlight an award given by Aviation week’s to Hamilton Sundstrand for their 
innovative MRO packages. 
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Exhibit 44: MRO Innovation Award for Hamilton Sundstrand 
 
 
Service 
HS maintains a global presence to meet the needs of commercial airline customers 
worldwide through their network of customer support managers. Customer support 
managers provide customers a single point of contact for all their support needs and avoid 
duplicate calls from various parts of the HS organization. This allows HS to increase its 
focus on managing accounts for the top airlines worldwide. 
 
Human Resource Management & Development 
HS recognized that their best competitive advantage is their employees. HS can always 
develop new technology, but any technological edge is fleeting in today’s world where 
HS competitors can develop or adapt similar technologies. What distinguish HS from 
their competitors are the skills, attitudes and commitment of the employees. Therefore HS 
“A model for meeting the tough 
requirements that airline customers 
face now and in the future.” 
Kenneth Gazzola 
Publisher, Aviation Week 
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invest continually in their employee education so that a culture of continuous learning is 
embedded in HS employee to enable them to adapt quickly to new ways of doing 
business. Employees are given the necessary information and tools to understand and 
meet HS customers’ needs and desires, so that they can develop and provide value-added 
solutions for HS customers. 
 
Technology Development 
The people, the products and the processes of various businesses are helping HS venture 
into new dimensions of systems integration. These businesses are combining expertise, 
building new skill sets and integrating system packages to a degree traditionally 
performed by the aircraft manufacturers themselves. By doing this, HS revolutionize the 
level of value that they bring to their customers such as the aircraft and engine 
manufacturer. Base on HS capabilities to integrate complex aircraft systems, Boeing has 
tapped HS to supply seven major systems for the Boeing B787. HS and its international 
team of business enterprises are also leading suppliers for the Airbus A380 now in 
development.  
 
Firm Infrastructure 
HS have a proven management team which has significant aerospace industry 
experiences. The present President Dave Hess joined Hamilton Sundstrand in 1979 and 
has held various senior executive positions at Hamilton Sundstrand since 1995. Various 
business units’ leaderships have an average tenure in the company of at least 25 years 
either within the company or within the parent company, United Technologies 
Corporation.  
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Purchasing 
Today, the typical HS plant sources MRO supplies from as many as 500 traditional 
distributors. This has the potential to generate excess or duplicate inventories throughout 
the supply chain and thousands of purchase orders and invoices. It also increases the 
likelihood of ill-managed storerooms, and the chance of stock oversight. Additionally, a 
substantial portion of a plant's MRO supplies are often "non-stock" purchases, resulting in 
high cost and time-consuming efforts by plant personnel to source the item and validate 
that it meets proper specification. Such procurement inefficiencies cause plant 
productivity and working capital to suffer. HS Supply Chain Management is a proven 
business strategy that has gained wide acceptance in recent years due to increasing 
customer demands for quality, delivery, and speed. Increased speeds of communicating 
coupled with cost reduction and more interdependent supplier, provider, and customer 
relationships have accelerated the integration of supply chains on a company wide basis. 
 
Weakness 
Hamilton Sundstrand is not without its challenges. The global presence in both 
manufacturing and MRO facilities may result in over capacity in sudden industry 
downturn. Duplication of capabilities could also result in dis-economy of scale for 
production and create inefficiency. A lean customer service organization that have such a 
dispersed work force and diverse cultural background around the world would presents 
challenges on the communications front.  
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To improve HS ability to better compete in the global marketplace, HS need to initiate 
actions to review and eliminate excess capacity, consolidate core work to the lower cost 
HS plants, and outsource non-core products and services from other companies able to 
supply them at the lowest cost with the quality HS require. HS should also focus on 
continuous improvement programs to maintain its operation excellence. HS have a good 
future but only if it transforms its operations to be more efficient, more cost-effective and 
faster in responding to the customers’ needs. Airline industry is going through major 
changes with LCC competition and high oil prices, and HS has to be flexible to quickly 
respond to those changes so that HS can continue to provide value to the customers. 
 
Opportunity 
Emerging Asian markets  
Emerging Asian markets including the Indian and Chinese aviation markets are amongst 
the fastest growing markets in the world for new aircrafts. Strong economic growth, 
favorable and diverse demographics along with the proliferation of low cost carrier in the 
Asian regions makes them highly attractive markets for HS as these factors drive growth 
in revenue passenger miles (RPM). In fact, the Chinese and the Indian markets have been 
identified as one the most promising air travel market in the chapter on Market Potential 
for Asian LCC, which will lead to higher sales for new aircrafts and MRO services.  
 
Growth of Low Cost Carriers 
In the chapters on the Asia Pacific Airlines Fleet Analysis, the network airlines is 
projected to grow at 5.5% with the LCC projecting to grow four times faster at 20.5%. 
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With the LCC shifting to narrow-body aircraft type such as the B737 and A320, this 
would benefit HS on both commercial aircraft production as well as aftermarket service 
and spares revenue levels. Additionally, the A320 market share is estimated to grow from 
today’s 20% to 49% in 2009. This would spell higher revenue growth for HS as it has 
almost twice the system content on the A320 vs. the B737 as shown in exhibit 42. Further 
increases in passenger revenue per miles and continued positive global economic 
conditions are expected to result in increased commercial aerospace volume in 2006.  
 
Threat 
Airline Poor Financial Health 
The commercial airline industry continues to experience poor financial performance, 
which was exacerbated in 2005 by escalating fuel prices. As such, airlines and aircraft 
manufacturers will continue to pursue lower-cost packages from their suppliers such as 
HS. For the foreseeable future, airlines will demand lower-cost but high-quality MRO 
services as well as faster turnaround time. A change in corporate culture and maintenance 
processes should be a mandatory first step for any MRO organization that wants to 
remain competitive in an ever-evolving business.  
 
Intense Competition  
As mentioned in the earlier review of the MRO industry, the slower growth rate in mature 
market such as North America & Europe will drive more experienced foreign MROs to 
seek greener pasture in Asia Pacific. With more foreign MROs competing with the 
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regional MRO organizations for the same slice of the market. The decreased 
concentration of MRO market players will further increase the industry rivalry within the 
Asia Pacific region. HS regional MRO facilities will face intense competition from these 
foreign MRO providers. Some of the firms such as Lufthansa Technik and SR Technics 
become a threat by their sheer size and their ability to provide a host of other services.  
 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
Conclusions from the findings 
From the analysis of the modified Porter’s five forces framework, we have observed the 
MRO Industry is extremely competitive. The "service" is almost a commodity and there 
are very strong competitors in the arena. Given the harsh business conditions that the low 
cost carriers are facing, they are price takers. The lower yield face by all airlines as shown 
in exhibit 1 and persistence high oil prices means the only way to increase the profits is 
slashing down their cost. The MRO expenses (averaging 13% of overall airline cost) 
compose a high percentage of the airline costs as shown in Exhibit 3B, therefore 
achieving lower maintenance costs is a competitive advantage for the airline sector.  
 
The analysis also throws some light on what LCC wants in their MRO service provider. 
Safety is key consideration as they need to satisfy the regulatory requirement before they 
are given the air operation certificate by the civil aviation authority. MRO service 
provider whose IT systems provide flexible solutions to help plan, manage and track 
maintenance as well as to keep up with the latest regulatory changes is welcome by LCC. 
Not only are airlines interested in MROs with IT systems that can track day-to-day 
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maintenance, but airlines also want to make sure that MROs' IT systems are capable of 
integrating with theirs. LCC is very focus on reducing their cost but not at the expense of 
aircraft reliability. LCC simplified routes structure, primarily point-to-point transit instead 
of transfers at hubs to allow highest utilization of planes imply that MRO service that 
guarantee aircraft availability by maintaining the aircraft systems to the highest quality 
and reliability is seek by the LCC. Another facet of LCCs continuous drive towards a 
lower cost base is their weaken loyalty to any MRO service provider. Therefore it is 
important for MRO to increase the exit barrier in their service package or entice the LCCs 
to commit to a long term service agreements.  
 
What are the key success factors for Hamilton Sundstrand to compete in this 
environment? From the framework proposed by Grant (2002) as shown in exhibit 38, HS 
engineering expertise and capabilities in integrating their whole supply chain to bring 
added value to their customers has put them in a strong position and a source of their 
competitive advantage. Additionally, the growing engineering expertise in aircrafts 
system integration has allow HS to get into more and more contents on major aircraft 
programs as shown in Exhibit 42. The A320 market share is estimated to grow from 
today’s 20% to 49% in 2009. The significant content HS has on the narrow body aircraft 
such as the A320 will allow it to continue to grow their after market business volume. 
The key is to lock in these customers for the long term to raise the market entry barrier for 
other potential competitors. With their global presence and closer proximity to the 
customers and technical know-how, this will be critical differentiating factors that HS has 
over the competition. 
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Recommendations for Hamilton Sundstrand 
From strategic assessment of the company resources, it has provided answers to two key 
questions. What opportunities exist for economizing on the use of finance, inventories 
and fixed assets? What are the possibilities for employing existing assets more profitably? 
This will be answer in following section.   
 
Exploit the Internet 
As we progress into the future, the ways in which we conduct our daily tasks will 
continue to grow and improve, all thanks to science and technology. The improvements 
of tomorrow will be miles ahead of those made yesterday. One area where we can see this 
constant betterment is on the Internet. The capabilities of the Internet have expanded 
immensely, making e-commerce an increasingly valuable tool. In the world of MRO, e-
commerce coupled with integrated supply has the ability to redefine the MRO supply 
chain. Today, the typical HS plant sources MRO supplies from as many as 500 traditional 
distributors. This has the potential to generate excess or duplicate inventories throughout 
the supply chain and thousands of purchase orders and invoices. It also increases the 
likelihood of ill-managed storerooms, and the chance of stock oversight. Additionally, a 
substantial portion of a plant's MRO supplies are often "non-stock" purchases, resulting in 
high cost and time-consuming efforts by plant personnel to source the item and validate 
that it meets proper specification. Such procurement inefficiencies cause plant 
productivity and working capital to suffer. When combined, integrated supply and e-
commerce have the capabilities to reverse these weaknesses. HS should enhance this area 
to better manage its asset and provide visibility to the both suppliers and customers that 
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uses HS repair services and purchase parts to support their airline operations. This should 
not limit to just manufacturing  activities but the whole supply chain. 
 
Continuous Improvement 
To improve HS ability to better compete in the global marketplace, HS need to initiate 
actions to review and eliminate excess manufacturing capacity, consolidate core work to 
the lower cost HS plants, and outsource non-core products and services from other 
companies able to supply them at the lowest cost with the quality HS require. Since 
substitute competition can come from many directions such as alternative resources, 
technological innovations, new business models etc. It is difficult to counter such threat. 
The key is to persuade potential competitors that substitution is unlikely to be profitable. 
According to Grant (2002), this can be achieved through committing the company to 
continuous improvement. Therefore, HS should focus on continuous improvement 
programs to maintain its operation excellence. HS have a good future but only if it 
transforms its operations to be more efficient, more cost-effective and faster in 
responding to the customers’ needs.  
 
Long Term Programs 
Every industry needs to reinvent from the customer backwards as Kirkpatrick and Hamel 
(2004) argued. HS need to bring more innovation to the demand chain as they brought to 
the supply chain. How do LCC learn about this product or service? How do LCC pay for 
it? Acquire it? Use it? Experience it? And how do LCC build a relationship over time 
with the vendor? To lock in customer for the long term need an overall marketing strategy 
to bring exceptional value to the customer. This can be achieves through the many 
innovative programs that HS is currently marketing. CARE, which stands for 
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Comprehensive Accessory Repair & Exchange Program is one such program. HS should 
expand this program to cover the type of aircraft and engine that LCC deployed in their 
operation. The channel of distribution would also have to change. HS should tie in with 
other MRO or OEM to provide a nose to tail solution. Under such a program, the airline 
pay a fixed hourly maintenance rate based on the flying hours. This allows the airline to 
move from managing individual transaction cost to a more predictable overall 
maintenance cost based on flying hours. This program encompasses both repair and asset 
management as shown in exhibit 45. CARE will provide a 24-hour support to manage all 
operational demands of customer aircraft operation. Whenever a part failed on the 
aircraft, a unit is immediately dispatched to meet the requirement. The failed component 
will be routed to CARE vendors for repair before returning to CARE warehouse to 
standby for the next request.  
 
Exhibit 45: CARE Program Process and Benefits 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Hamilton Sundstrand 
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Upon joining the program, the airline does not have to own expensive inventory and has 
the option to sell back the inventory to HS. This eliminate the inventory cost for the 
airline, which can average around 21% based on a AeroStrategy’s study as shown in 
exhibit 46.  
 
Exhibit 46: Average Inventory Holding Costs 
 
Source: AeroStrategy 
 
To ensure high quality repair, the repair services are carried by the OEM, who has the 
engineering resources to ensure the component highest reliability. Normally, OEM 
benefits when parts break down since they sell the replacements. Under the CARE 
program, they benefit when the parts don’t break down since they are responsible for 
keeping the equipment running. LCC pursuing a high growth strategy will benefit greatly 
from such a program as earlier industry analysis shows that maintenance is traditionally 
one of the main barriers to entry for any low cost carrier. Setting up an in-house 
maintenance department requires a high level of capital investment in facilities and 
components that a low cost new carrier simply can’t afford if it is to be competitive. 
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Another program called On-Site Program provides onsite inventory to customers’ point of 
use. This simplified the process of moving parts to the Airline Component Shops (Exhibit 
47). It integrates the supply chain between HS and the customer and eliminates the 
middleman or broker cost.  
 
Exhibit 47: On-site Program Simplified Processes 
 
 
 
 
Source: Hamilton Sundstrand 
 
The program includes buyback of customer current inventory and guarantee part 
availability at 95% Service Level. It eliminates inventory carrying costs & obsolescence 
risk. Overall, the program offer potential customer the possibilities of reduced total costs, 
reduced time waiting for parts, and reduced inventory. 
 
Sales and Marketing 
A lean customer service organization that have such a dispersed work force and diverse 
cultural background around the world would presents challenges on the communications 
front. Communications is the key to success. HS must continue to improve 
communications at all levels of the company. Rapid dissemination of information would 
allow HS organization to take advantage of any new opportunities that arise. HS 
maintains a global presence to meet the needs of commercial airline customers worldwide 
through their network of customer support managers. Customer support managers provide 
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customers a single point of contact for all their support needs and avoid duplicate calls 
from various parts of the HS organization. This allows HS to increase its focus on 
managing accounts for the top airlines worldwide and increase its sensitivity to the 
market. HS need to continue to provide their employees with the information and tools to 
understand and meet their customers’ needs and desires, today and in the future.  
 
Pursuing a Differentiation Strategy 
Hamilton Sundstrand should pursue a differentiation strategy for its unique selling 
proposition of OEM quality at a guarantee cost. The tangible differentiation is concerned 
with observable characteristic of the service such as proximity of MRO operation to 
customer base of operation, and local focus with one interface between HS and the 
customer via the customer support manager. HS technical know-how to repair its product 
line and engineering expertise to continuously improve the reliability of the parts at no 
cost to customer is another tangible differentiation. Since customer pay a fixed rate per 
flying hour on the CARE program, the OEM now has more motivations to improve the 
product reliability as its revenue becomes fixed. Any product reliability issues will 
ultimately impact the service provider bottom line. Differentiation is also concerned with 
the provision of uniqueness. As Grant (2002) mentioned, a firm’s opportunities for 
creating uniqueness in its offering to customers are not located within a particular 
function or activity but can arise in virtually everything it does. Michael Porter identifies 
a number of drivers of uniqueness over which the firm exercises control. These are: 
• Product features and product performance (HS technical expertise and OEM 
services). 
• Complementary services (HS fast delivery and product improvement) 
• Intensity of marketing activities (e.g. thru HS customer support focus approach) 
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• Technologies embodied in design and manufacture which only the OEM or HS has 
prior information. 
• The quality of the purchase input. 
• Procedures influencing the conduct of each activities (e.g. quality control, onsite 
support etc) 
• Skill and experience of employees. 
• Location (proximity to customer operation) 
• The degree of vertical integration (HS integrated supply chain).  
 
Themes for Further Studies 
This market study is limited to the study of low cost carrier, the impact of this business 
model to the Asia Pacific airline industry and the MRO industry. Additionally, we 
examine OEM such as Hamilton Sundstrand and determine how it can take advantage of 
the LCC explosive growth in the changing competitive landscape. In future studies, there 
is potential to explore further from the perspective of the incumbent network airlines how 
they would respond to the LCC challenge. Another area of study is for Hamilton 
Sundstrand to determine what MRO services would incumbent expect from the OEM. 
Would they follow the Lufthansa German Airlines strategy of backward integration or 
goes down another strategic path? Finally, the other area that could be studied is how 
Hamilton Sundstrand can change its organization structure in order to be better organized 
for continued success of its after market support to meet the changing needs of its 
customers.  
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Appendix 1  
 
Asia Pacific LCC Aircraft Fleet Plan: 2004 - 2009 
Operator 2005 2006E 2007E 2008E 2009E
ADAM AIR 16 18 18 18 18
AERO ASIA 3 1 1 1 1
AIR DECCAN 7 20 31 41 51
AIR INDIA EXPRESS 3 7 7 7 7
AIRASIA 21 32 44 56 76
AIRBLUE 3 5 5 5 5
ALLIANCE AIR 11 10 10 10 10
CEBU PACIFIC AIR 18 20 22 22 22
CITILINK 4 2 2 2 2
FREEDOM AIR 4 7 7 7 7
GOAIR 2 3 3 3 3
AIR DO 4 5 5 5 5
INDIGO 0 6 15 23 29
INDONESIA AIRASIA 4 6 6 6 6
JAL EXPRESS 12 12 12 12 12
JETSTAR 24 30 32 32 32
JETSTAR ASIA 9 8 8 8 8
KINGFISHER AIRLINES 7 18 24 32 41
LION AIRLINES 23 24 30 40 50
NOK AIR 3 4 4 4 4
ONE-TWO-GO 15 12 12 12 12
PACIFIC BLUE AIRLINES 3 3 3 3 3
PB AIR 1 1 1 1 1
SHAHEEN AIR INTERNATIONAL 3 4 4 4 4
SKYMARK AIRLINES 7 9 9 9 9
SKYNET ASIA AIRWAYS 6 6 6 6 6
SPICEJET 5 9 15 15 15
STAR FLYER 0 3 4 4 4
THAI AIRASIA 8 10 10 10 10
TIGER AIRWAYS 4 9 12 12 12
VIRGIN BLUE AIRLINES 47 47 47 53 60
Total 277 351 409 463 525  
Source: ACAS, 2006 
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Appendix 2 
 
Asia Pacific LCC fleet – July 2006 
Embraer BAE
Operator A319 A320 A321 717 737 747 757 767 DC9 MD80 MD90 ERJ145 1-11 ATR-42 ATR-72 Total
ADAM AIR 19 19
AERO ASIA 1 4 5
AIR DECCAN 14 13 4 31
AIR INDIA EXPRESS 7 7
AIRASIA 7 19 26
AIRBLUE 3 2 5
CEBU PACIFIC AIR 6 2 1 11 20
CITILINK 2 2
FREEDOM AIR 7 7
GOAIR 3 3
AIR DO 2 3 5
INDONESIA AIRASIA 6 6
JETSTAR AIRWAYS 24 6 30
JETSTAR ASIA AIRWAYS 8 8
KINGFISHER AIRLINES 4 8 12
LION AIRLINES 12 12 5 29
NOK AIR 4 4
ONE-TWO-GO 7 1 4 12
PACIFIC BLUE AIRLINES 3 3
PB AIR 1 2 3
SKYMARK AIRLINES 3 6 9
SKYNET ASIA AIRWAYS 6 6
SPICEJET 6 6
STAR FLYER 3 3
THAI AIRASIA 10 10
TIGER AIRWAYS 6 6
VIRGIN BLUE AIRLINES 47 47
Total 10 85 2 6 147 7 2 10 11 16 5 2 4 13 4 324
% Composition 3.1 26.2 0.6 1.9 45.4 2.2 0.6 3.1 3.4 4.9 1.5 0.6 1.2 4.0 1.2
Airbus Boeing ATR
 
Source: ACAS, 2006 
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Appendix 3  
 
Asia Pacific LCC fleet – up to 2015 
Embraer BAE
Operator A320 A330 A340 A350 A380 717 737 737NG 747 757 767 787 DC9 MD80 MD90 ERJ145 1-11 ATR-42 ATR-72 Total
ADAM AIR 12 18 30
AERO ASIA 1 1
AIR DECCAN 76 4 13 31 124
AIR INDIA EXPRESS 7 7
AIRASIA 100 19 119
AIRBLUE 7 2 9
ALLIANCE AIR 10 10
CEBU PACIFIC AIR 14 1 7 22
CITILINK 2 2
FREEDOM AIR 7 7
GOAIR 13 13
AIR DO 2 3 5
INDIGO 100 100
INDONESIA AIRASIA 6 6
JAL EXPRESS 7 5 12
JETSTAR 24 2 6 12 44
JETSTAR ASIA 8 8
KINGFISHER AIRLINES 51 5 5 5 5 71
LION AIRLINES 12 60 8 4 84
NOK AIR 4 4
ONE-TWO-GO 7 1 4 12
PACIFIC BLUE AIRLINES 3 3
PB AIR 1 2 3
SHAHEEN AIR INTERNATIONAL 4 4
SKYMARK AIRLINES 3 6 9
SKYNET ASIA AIRWAYS 6 6
SPICEJET 25 25
STAR FLYER 4 4
THAI AIRASIA 10 10
TIGER AIRWAYS 12 12
VIRGIN BLUE AIRLINES 60 60
Total 428 9 5 5 5 6 101 158 7 2 10 12 7 17 4 2 4 13 31 826
% Composition 51.8 1.1 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 12.2 19.1 0.8 0.2 1.2 1.5 0.8 2.1 0.5 0.2 0.5 1.6 3.8
ATRBoeingAirbus
 
Source: ACAS, 2006 
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Appendix 4  
Outline of Major Carriers in Japan 
Capital
Domestic 
Passengers
Domestic 
Mkt Share
Intemational 
Passengers Total
(Unit:1) (Unit:2) % (Unit:2) (Unit:2)
Domestic: Domestic: -77,300
Oct.20,1952 29 -81,200
International: International:
Aug.14,1953 187
International: International: -2,700
Aug.29,1975 5 -2,800
Irregular: International: 800
Feb.22,1991 7 600
International:
Jul.30,1999
Domestic: Domestic: 2,200
Jul.17,1973 17 2,000
Domestic: Domestic: -400
Mar.20,1998 4 -400
Domestic: Domestic: 2,300
Feb.14,1962 64 400
International: International:
Apr.28,1988 9
Domestic: Domestic: 1,000
Nov,2.1983 30 800
Domestic: Domestic: 24,000
Oct.15,1953 84 25,100
International: International:
Jan.31,1986 57
International: International: 3,400
Aug.13,1983 33 2,400
Domestic: Domestic: 1,900
Aug.3,1974 70 2,600
International: International:
Nov.11,1994 4
Irregular: International: 200
Feb.8,1991 4 200
International:
Nov.7,2000
Domestic: Domestic: -300
Jul.28,1998 3 -600
International:
Jul.19,2002
Domestic: Domestic: 1,700
Oct.26,1998 2 1,500
Domestic: Domestic: -1,200
May 21,2002 2 -1,300
Source: Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport
1. Skymark Airlines' accounts are figures of the October period in 2003 (November 2002-October 2003).
2. Aircraft includes joint-operation airplanes
3. Airlines include code-sharing flights.
4. Skynet Asia Airways has launched since August 2002.
0.8%
0.8%
4.5%
1.7%
25.5%
SNA
Skynet Asia 
Airways
Carrier outline (As of January 2004)
Unit:1=million yen
Transport results in fiscal 2003
Unit:2=1,000persons
2.9%
0.9%
18.6%
1.4%
43.0%
ANK
Air Nippon
AJX      
Air Japan
SKY
Skymark 
Airlines
ADO
Hokkaido 
Internationa
l Airlines
Remark:
JAL
Japan 
Airlines
JAA
Japan Asia 
Airways
JAZ
JAL ways
JTA
Japan 
Trans 
Ocean Air
JEX
JAL 
Express
JAS
Japan Air 
System
JAC
Japan Air 
Commuter
ANA
All Nippon 
Airways
NCA
Nippon 
Cargo Air 
Lines
790 - 790
1997 2,500 4 511 710 - 710
1996 2,300 3 367
- 510 510
1996 6,600 5 726 1,550 40 1,590
1990 50 20 214
- - -
1974 5,400 107 1,581 4,180 100 4,280
1978 21,600 11 794
1,340 - 1,340
1952 86,200 142 13,119 40,090 3,200 43,290
1983 300 23 474
810 - 810
1971 23,500 84 5,022 17,360 10 17,370
1997 5,800 17 250
- 1,350 1,350
1967 4,500 43 706 2,670 - 2,670
1990 3,000 48 1,224
23,780 10,820 34,600
1975 4,300 76 720 - 920 920
1951 188,600 163 16,075
Items
Title of 
carrier
Establish
ment License date Airlines Fleet Personnel
Accounts in fiscal 
2003
Upper:Operation 
balancd
Lower:Current 
balance(Unit:million 
yen)
 
 
 
 
- 143 - 
Appendix 5 
ASEAN Member Countries Basic Information 
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Appendix 6 
 
ASEAN Framework Agreement for the Integration of Priority 
Sectors 
Roadmap for Integration of Air Travel Sector 
 
I. OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this initiative is to advance the full liberalisation of air transport services in ASEAN, to achieve the 
ASEAN Leaders’ vision of Open Sky in the ASEAN region. This Roadmap will build upon the Roadmap for ASEAN 
Competitive Air Services Policy adopted by the Ninth ATM Meeting in Yangon, Myanmar in October 2003. The 
Roadmap will complement the overall policy goals of the Action Plan for ASEAN Air Transport Integration and 
Liberalisation to be adopted at the Tenth ATM in Phnom Penh, Cambodia in November 2004. 
 
II. MEASURES 
This Roadmap provides concrete actions that ASEAN Member Countries shall pursue to achieve greater and 
significant air transport liberalisation in ASEAN, through a staged and progressive implementation. This roadmap 
includes issues specific to a) Liberalisation of air freight services; and b) Liberalisation of scheduled passenger 
services. 
 
In the implementation, two or more ASEAN Member Countries who are ready can negotiate, conclude and sign 
implementing agreements/arrangements in line with the ASEAN-X Formula, on a plurilateral, multilateral or sub-
regional basis. The other Member Countries could join in the implementation when they are ready. ASEAN 
Member Countries can also conclude more liberal bilateral arrangements for air services liberalisation. 
ASEAN Member Countries shall be provided flexibility with regard to the implementation of the proposed timeline for the specific 
measures. 
 
III. COVERAGE 
The liberalisation measures will cover the movement/carriage of both passengers and cargo or freight by air transport. 
 
NO.  MEASURES IMPLEMENTING BODY  TIMEL
 
 
SPECIFIC ISSUES 
 
I  Liberalisation of Air Freight Services  
1  Liberalisation of air freight services with no limitation of third and fourth freedom traffic  Senior Transport Officials Meeting 
 December 2006   rights and with increased tonnage and 
additional designated points to those stated in  (STOM) through Air Transport   
 the ASEAN MOU on Air Freight Services (2002)  Working Group (ATWG)    
2 Full liberalisation of ASEAN air freight services   
 December 2008  
II  Liberalisation of Scheduled Passenger Services  
3  Liberalisation of scheduled passenger services with no limitations on third and fourth   STOM through ATWG 
 December 2005   freedom traffic rights for all designated 
points within the ASEAN sub-regions      
4  Liberalisation of scheduled passenger services with no limitations on third and fourth    
 December 2006   freedom traffic rights for at least 
two designated points in each country between the      
5  Liberalisation of scheduled passenger services with no limitations on fifth freedom    
 December 2006   traffic rights for all designated 
points within the ASEAN sub-regions      
6  Liberalisation of scheduled passenger services with no limitations on fifth freedom    
 December 2008   traffic rights for at least two 
designated points in each country between the ASEAN      
7  ASEAN-wide liberalisation of scheduled passenger services, with no limitations on    
 December 2008   third and fourth freedom traffic 
rights for the capital city in each ASEAN Member Country     
8  ASEAN-wide liberalisation of scheduled passenger services, with no limitations on fifth    
 December 2010   freedom traffic rights for the 
capital city in each ASEAN Member Country      
III         Enhancing Capacity Building Programmes  
9  Enhancing capacity building programmes to facilitate transition towards full air               STOM through ATWG  2005-
2010   services liberalisation      
 
Note: Air travel shall be deemed to refer to air transport                                                 Source: Appendix I Roadmap for Integration of Air 
Travel Sector 
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Appendix 7 
Air Freedom Rights 
 
Traditionally, an airline needs the approval of the governments of the various countries involved before it can fly in or out of a country, 
or even across another country without landing. Prior to World War II, this did not present too many difficulties since the range of 
commercial planes was limited and air transport networks were in their infancy and nationally oriented. In 1944, an International 
Convention was held in Chicago to establish the framework for all future bilateral and multilateral agreements for the use of 
international air spaces. Five freedom rights were designed, but a multilateral agreement went only as far as the first two freedoms 
(right to overfly and right to make a technical stop). Freedoms are not automatically granted to an airline as a right, they are privileges 
that have to be negotiated. All other freedoms have to be negotiated by bilateral agreements, such as the 1946 agreement between the 
United States and the UK, which permitted limited "fifth freedom" rights. The 1944 Convention has been extended since then, and 
there are currently nine different freedoms (see above picture): 
• First Freedom. The right to fly from a home country over another country (A) en-route to another (B) without landing. Also 
called the transit freedom.  
• Second Freedom. The right for a flight from a home country to land in another country (A) for purposes other than carrying 
passengers, such as refueling, maintenance or emergencies. The final destination is country B.  
• Third Freedom. The right to carry passengers from a home country to another country (A) for purpose of commercial services.  
• Fourth Freedom. The right to fly from another country (A) to a home country for purpose of commercial services.  
Third and Fourth Freedoms are the basis for direct commercial services, providing the rights to load and unload passengers, mail and 
freight in another country. 
• Fifth Freedom. This freedom enables airlines to carry passengers from a home country to another intermediate country (A), and 
then fly on to third country (B) with the right to pick passengers in the intermediate country. Also referred to as "beyond right". 
This freedom divided into two categories: Intermediate Fifth Freedom Type is the right to carry from the third country to second 
country. Beyond Fifth Freedom Type is the right to carries from second country to the third country.  
• Sixth Freedom. Not formally part of the original 1944 convention, it refers to the right to carry passengers between two 
countries (A and B) through an airport in the home country. With the hubbing function of most air transport networks, this 
freedom has become more common, notably in Europe (London, Amsterdam).  
• Seventh Freedom. Covers the right to operate a passenger services between two countries (A and B) outside the home country.  
• Eighth Freedom. Also referred to as "cabotage" privileges. It involves the right to move passengers on a route from a home 
country to a destination country (A) that uses more than one stop along which passengers may be loaded and unloaded.  
• Ninth Freedom. Also referred to as "full cabotage" or "open-skies" privileges. It involves the right of a home country to move 
passengers within another country (A).  
Source: http://people.hofstra.edu/geotrans/eng/ch3en/conc3en/airfreedom.html 
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Appendix 8 
Details of China Aviation Market Liberalization  
Country Date Details 
Australia 9-Jul-03 Liberalized air services agreement, removing all designation 
restrictions, allowing expanded codeshare rights, removing 
restrictions on services between regional centers in Australia and 
China, and doubling capacity for services to Sydney, Melbourne, 
Brisbane and Perth. 
Japan 1-Aug-03 Liberalized agreement, increasing weekly frequencies between the 
two countries by 35 each and adding three gateway airports in each 
country. 
Thailand 1-Jan-04 Open Skies. 
UK 4-Feb-04 British airlines are allowed to increase their weekly flights  
from 10 to 15 in 2004 and to 25 in 2005 and 31 in 2006. 
S. Korea 19-Mar-04 Liberalized bilateral air services agreement, providing  
multiple carrier designation on three routes between the  
countries and additional capacity. 
US 24-Jul-04 Liberalized bilateral air services agreement, increasing total capacity 
by 3.6x to 249 from 54 by 2008 (128 for passenger flights and 121 for 
cargo flights, up from 17 and 37, respectively), removing all 
designation restrictions,              allowing for the establishment of 
cargo hub in China provided that a carrier reaches the threshold of 72 
flights per week, and lifting all limits on code-sharing agreements. 
Hong 
Kong 
8-Sep-04 Liberalized bilateral air services agreement, increasing number of 
round trip passenger flights by 30% to 800 a week and the number of 
round-trip all-cargo flights by 100% to 42.  
 
Source: Center for Asia Pacific Aviation 
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Appendix 9 
Food Chain Analysis of Low Cost Carriers 
 
  
 
 
Low Cost Carriers
Aircraft Fleet Passengers
Airports Hotels/Car Rental / Property Internet Services
Aircraft 
Manufacturer
Aircraft Engine & 
Component 
Manufacturer
Leasing / 
Financing and 
Management
Aircraft & 
Component MRO
Aircraft Manufacturers 
with narrow body 
aircraft product line
•Airbus (A319, A320, 
A321)
•Boeing (B737, B737NG)
Engine Manufacturer 
for narrow body aircraft
•CFM56 by CFM 
International
•V2500 by IAE
•JT8D by Pratt Whitney
Leasing Co. which deal 
in narrow body aircraft
•Boullioun Aviation 
Services
•S’pore Aircraft Leasing 
Enterprise
•Aviation Capital Group
•Bavaria Int’l Aircraft
•Volito Aviation
Major MRO 
companies in Asia
•ST Aerospace
•SIAEC
•HAECO
•ANZES
•GAMECO
Dedicated Low Cost 
Terminal
•Singapore Budget 
Terminal
•KLIA Budget Terminal
Major Airport in Asia
Thailand
•Bangkok Int’l Airport
•Phuket Int’l Airport
•Chiang Mai Int’l Airport
Singapore
•Changi Airport
Indonesia
•Jakarta Int’l Airport
China
•Minangkabau Int’l Airport
•Shenzhen Bao An Int’l 
Airport 
Hong Kong
•Hong Kong Int’l Airport
Taiwan
•CKS Int’l Airport
Macau
•Macau Int’l Airport
Philippines
•Manila Int’l Airport
•Clark Field Airport
Malaysia
•KL Int’l Airport
•Johor Sultan Ismail Airport
Vietnam
•Noi Bai Int’l Airport 
• Tan Son Nhat Int’l Airport 
Budget Hotels
Singapore
•Fragrance Group
Property
•Resorts, hotels & 
holidays home where 
LCCs fly to
Online travel 
Agencies
•Asiantravel.com
•Asiahotels.com
•Travel.com.au
•Priceline.com
•Expedia.com
•Tripadvisor.com
•Flightcentre.com.au
Ticketing & payment 
providers
•TravelSky Technology 
Ltd
•BilltoBill Ltd
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Appendix 10 
 
Hamilton Sundstrand Asia Pacific MRO Facilities 
 
 
 
Hamilton Sundstrand Qinling Aerospace (Xiamen)
•Repair services for 400 Hz Electric Power Generating 
Systems
Hamilton Sundstrand Customer Support Centre
(Malaysia)
•Repair Services for Air Management Systems
Hamilton Sundstrand Pacific Aerospace 
(Singapore)
•Repair Services for 400 Hz Electric Power 
Generating Systems
Fuel Accessory Service Technologies (Singapore)
•Repair Services for Jet Engine Fuel Accessories  
